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Note 
NO REQUIREMENT LEFT BEHIND:  THE 
INADVERTENT DISCOVERY 
REQUIREMENT—PROTECTING CITIZENS 
ONE FILE AT A TIME 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of computers came the dawn of a new age—a 
Digital Age.  Many take for granted the ability of computers to assist and 
manage our daily lives, but few recognize that complex problems arise 
through the application of historic doctrines to new technology.1  For 
instance, during the government investigation of steroid use in Major 
League Baseball, government officials obtained a search warrant to seize 
the steroid testing results of ten specific players.2  However, in executing 
                                                 
1 Perhaps Justice Stewart said it best almost forty years ago when he aptly cautioned 
that “[i]f times have changed . . . in an urban and industrial world, the changes have made 
the values served by the Fourth Amendment more, not less, important.”  Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971). 
2 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug Testing III), 
579 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), revised and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).  Although the Ninth Circuit revised its decision, the only 
substantial change was the omission of certain language affirmatively implementing 
mandatory government procedures, which instead now comprises part of a concurring 
opinion.  See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug 
Testing IV), 621 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); id. at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., 
concurring).  For this reason, citations hereinafter to the Comprehensive Drug Testing 
decision will reference both en banc panel decisions, and will do so interchangeably at 
times (although the Notewriter is aware the original en banc decision was ultimately 
revised and superseded). 
 This decision has an extensive procedural history.  The case was first decided in front 
of a panel of three Ninth Circuit judges, and the opinion can be found at United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug Testing I), 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006).  
This panel decision was withdrawn and superseded by a second panel decision also 
consisting of three judges; the opinion can be found at United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug Testing II), 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008).  This second panel 
decision was ultimately withdrawn, and the case was heard en banc before eleven judges 
of the Ninth Circuit. See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 993. 
 Because of the potentially enormous impact of the decision, the Ninth Circuit, on 
November 4, 2009, ordered that both parties “file simultaneous briefs addressing whether 
this case should be reheard en banc by the full court” by November 25, 2009.  Order for 
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., No. 05-10067 (9th Cir. Nov. 4 2009), 
available at http://volokh.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/CDTOrder.pdf.  On 
November 23, 2009, the Department of Justice also filed an amicus brief in support of the 
rehearing en banc by the full court.  Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En 
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the warrant, the officials gained access to test results of thousands of 
other professional athletes from various professional sports.3  The 
difficult issue the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
had to resolve was whether the government should be able to keep the 
information relating to the players not specified in the warrant.4 
To date, only two Circuits—the Ninth and Tenth—have 
comprehensively addressed the unique issues raised by searches and 
seizures of computer-related or electronically stored information.5  
Furthermore, district courts have been unable to agree on a coherent 
understanding of how to reconcile new technology and existing 
standards.6  As a result, the case law and commentary regarding the 
application of constitutional doctrines to the search and seizure of 
computer information is discordant.7  At worst, there is high potential 
that courts will adopt misguided notions of constitutional protection and 
                                                                                                             
Banc by the Full Court, Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989 (2009) (No. 05-10067).  
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit heard the case again en banc, resulting in Comprehensive 
Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d 1162. 
3 Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 993.  The information seized by the 
government included, inter alia, the master list of all MLB players tested during the 2003 
season and a list of positive drug test results for eight of the ten specified players, 
intermingled with positive results for twenty-six other MLB players.  Id. at 997. 
4 Id.  The Ninth Circuit described the case as being about “the procedures and 
safeguards that federal courts must observe in issuing and administering search warrants 
and subpoenas for electronically stored information.”  Id. at 993. 
5 See infra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing the Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s approach to the issue); 
infra Part III.B–III.C (analyzing the positive and negative aspects of each approach).  For the 
purposes of this Note, the terms “computer-related,” “digital,” “electronic,” “electronically 
stored,” and “magnetically stored” evidence refer to the same general category of evidence.  
This evidence is generally the same as the evidence described in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as “electronically stored information.”  See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (Notes of 
Advisory Committee on 2006 Amendments) (noting that the wide variety of computer 
systems currently in use and the rapid pace of technological change counsels against a 
limiting or precise definition of electronically stored information).  The Committee was 
wise in using a term that accounts for all current methods of computer information and still 
allows for technological advancements.  See id. (indicating that the term electronically 
stored information should encompass data “stored in any medium” and allow for future 
developments in computer technology; it is a term “intended to be broad enough to cover 
all current types of computer-based information, and flexible enough to encompass future 
changes and developments”). 
6 See infra Parts II–III (providing background and analysis of the different approaches 
that circuit and district courts have taken to resolve novel issues). 
7 Compare Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 998 (holding that the government 
should forswear use of the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases), with United States 
v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that where police inadvertently 
discovered child pornography during search for fake ID-related information and 
subsequently applied for a second warrant, no constitutional violation occurred), and 
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the subjective 
intent of the officer is determinative). 
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thereby compromise the privacy and possessory interests of all 
Americans.  To ensure that the correct balance is struck between these 
two competing interests—the interest of the individual and that of the 
state—courts must espouse a solution that is sensitive to the efforts of 
law enforcement officials, while retaining the explicit protections 
provided by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.8 
This Note will first briefly provide a historical context of the Fourth 
Amendment, presenting relevant background information, detailing its 
two main requirements, and defining the terms of art within its text.9  
Part II further examines existing jurisprudential theories and how they 
attempt to reconcile the plain view doctrine with electronically stored 
and computer-related evidence.10  Next, Part III analyzes the feasibility of 
the various approaches and concludes that currently no one approach 
adequately balances all of the competing interests.11  Finally, Part IV 
offers a solution to the problems created by computer-related evidence 
and proposes that the Supreme Court implement the inadvertent 
discovery requirement of Coolidge v. New Hampshire as applied to such 
evidence.12 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Searches and seizures of computer data stored on personal 
computers and within extensive computer databases will compel courts 
to resolve situations in which relevant, incriminating evidence is 
intermingled with highly personal and entirely unrelated information.  
To date, at least one man has been sentenced to death following an 
officer’s electronic recovery of incriminating notes that were previously 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (“On one side of the balance are 
arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the 
other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.”); 
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1004 (“This case well illustrates both the 
challenges faced by modern law enforcement in retrieving information it needs 
to . . . prosecute wrongdoers, and the threat to the privacy of innocent parties from a 
vigorous criminal investigation.”). 
9 See infra Part II (presenting an overview of the history of the Fourth Amendment and 
what it has come to require). 
10 See infra Part II (examining the existing avenues that courts have taken to reconcile the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirements, the plain view doctrine, and searches for electronically 
stored evidence). 
11 See infra Part III (analyzing the positive and negative aspects of varying approaches). 
12 See infra Part IV (proposing that the Supreme Court preserve Coolidge’s inadvertent 
discovery requirement as applied to digital evidence by distinguishing such evidence from 
the physical evidence in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137–38 (1990)). 
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deleted.13  The government has also indicted a college student on felony 
fraud and software piracy charges after the government monitored the 
student’s website postings.14  This novel dilemma has yet to receive a 
great deal of attention from courts despite its inevitable significance on 
modern American life, and remains a relatively undeveloped area of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.15  However, two circuit courts 
addressed the issue—one directly and one indirectly—and formulated a 
special doctrine in an attempt to handle these searches and seizures.16 
Part II.A of this Note provides a general background to the Fourth 
Amendment, including information about its history and the motivation 
for its drafting and ratification.17  Next, Part II.A.1 and Part II.A.2 
examine two of the most essential requirements in Fourth Amendment 
analysis:  the warrant requirement and the particularity requirement, 
respectively.18  Then, Part II.A.3 precisely addresses what the term 
“seizure” means within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.19  Next, Part 
II.B of this Note discusses the Fourth Amendment’s application to 
computer evidence, the plain view doctrine (an exception to the warrant 
requirement), and the differing approaches that courts have taken in an 
attempt to solve the problem of applying the plain view doctrine in the 
context of computer-related evidence cases.20 
                                                 
13 See Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353, 1356–57 (Pa. 1991) (affirming 
appellant’s murder conviction and death sentence and holding, inter alia, that appellant’s 
attempt to delete computer files created only a mere hope of secrecy, which was not 
synonymous with a legally cognizable expectation of privacy). 
14 Peter H. Lewis, Student Accused of Running Network for Pirated Software, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 9, 1994, at A1 (discussing the government’s monitoring of a college student’s 
electronic bulletin board and Internet site, which ultimately resulted in a felony indictment 
on fraud and software piracy charges); see also Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of 
Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 77 n.11 (1994) (recounting these and 
many more horror stories involving overly broad searches and seizures of computer 
evidence). 
15 See, e.g., United States v. Jinwoo Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 944 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (basing 
almost the entire opinion off of Ninth Circuit case law because “neither the Fifth Circuit 
nor the United States Supreme Court have developed precedent” and “the Ninth Circuit 
has the most robust body of law on the subject matter.”). 
16 See infra Part II.B.2–3 (providing a background of the Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s 
differing approaches to the issue). 
17 See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of the Fourth Amendment as well as general 
Fourth Amendment principles). 
18 See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the warrant requirement); infra Part II.A.2 (discussing 
the particularity requirement). 
19 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the meaning of the term “seizure” within Fourth 
Amendment analysis). 
20 See infra Part II.B (discussing the Fourth Amendment as applied to computers, the 
plain view doctrine, and the differing approaches courts utilize to reconcile the two). 
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A. The Requirements of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted by 
Congress in 1789 and ratified by the states as a provision of the Bill of 
Rights in 1791.21  The Fourth Amendment guards against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by both federal and local law enforcement 
officials.22  It was drafted and ratified to ensure that the overly intrusive 
general searches conducted under English rule were not reinstated in the 
new nation.23  When examining the Fourth Amendment, the interests at 
                                                 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 724 (1999).  See generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT:  A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE pt. 1 (2006) (providing a 
descriptive account of early Fourth Amendment history and its surrounding 
circumstances). 
22 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960).  The Fourth Amendment ensures that  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Fourth Amendment history indicates that it was drafted to guard 
against the use of general warrants and Writs of Assistance, which were prevalent in 
Colonial England.  2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.10 (4th ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE].  The drafters of the Constitution considered 
such broad searches to be an unreasonable intrusion of privacy that necessitated protection.  
Id.  The Fourth Amendment, as adopted, is both brief and ambiguous; it gives no definition 
and little context to “unreasonable” and does not set forth detailed information regarding 
the requisite preconditions for the proper issuance of a warrant.  Id. 
 Further, it is beyond dispute that the Fourth Amendment, by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers as well as 
federal officers.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646–48 (1961) (holding that the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to the States the Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and also extended, inasmuch as necessary to 
ensure such rights, the exclusionary rule); see also Elkins, 364 U.S. at 215 (recounting the 
history of distinguishing between state and federal actors and discussing the ridiculous 
outcome that such an analysis creates).  According to the Court, no distinction can logically 
be drawn between evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that 
obtained in violation of the Fourteenth.  Id.  Moreover, to the victim it matters not whether 
his constitutional right has been invaded by a federal agent or by a state officer, for “[i]t 
would be a curiously ambivalent rule that would require the courts of the United States to 
differentiate between unconstitutionally seized evidence upon so arbitrary a basis.  Such a 
distinction indeed would appear to reflect an indefensibly selective evaluation of the 
provisions of the Constitution.”  Id. 
23 JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1966).  Our 
forefathers were less concerned about warrantless searches and more concerned about the 
issuance of overreaching and overbroad warrants.  Id.  The Court has noted that it is 
perhaps too much to say that Colonial-Americans “feared the warrant more than the 
search, but it is plain enough that the warrant was the prime object of their concern.  Far 
from looking at the warrant as a protection against unreasonable searches, they saw it as an 
authority for unreasonable and oppressive searches.”  TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN 
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stake are necessarily substantial.24  Thus, the Supreme Court has 
adamantly reaffirmed that, unless justified by an exception to the 
warrant requirement, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.25  
                                                                                                             
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969).  This Colonial struggle includes within its 
ambit the controversy in England over the issuance of general warrants to aid enforcement 
of the seditious libel laws and writs of assistance.  See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307, 311 (1978) (“An important forerunner of the first [ten] Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, the Virginia Bill of Rights, specifically opposed ‘general warrants . . . .’  
The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the Colonies immediately 
preceding the Revolution.”); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1977) (“[T]he 
Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ experience 
with the writs of assistance . . . [that] granted sweeping power to customs officials and 
other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods.”).  The Framers’ experience 
and familiarity with the abuses that accompanied the issuance of such general warrants 
provided the principal stimulus for the restraints on arbitrary governmental intrusions 
embodied in the Fourth Amendment.  Id.; see also THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT:  ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 40–42 (2008) (providing a detailed account 
of precisely why American colonists so detested the general warrants of English rule and 
suggesting that the Fourth Amendment was drafted almost entirely to prevent its 
reoccurrence is the newly formed United States).  Clancy also contends that the warrant 
was the “initial and primary object” of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 40 n.98.  See generally 
TAYLOR, supra, at 43 (noting that the history and drafting process of the Fourth Amendment 
strongly suggest that the warrant was the preeminent object of the amendment). 
24 See United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314–15 (1972) (specially 
noting the importance of the government and that of the individual).  The Court noted that 
because the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, it requires a court to examine 
and balance the basic values at stake in each case—the government’s duty to protect 
domestic security, and the potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance into 
individual privacy and free expression.  Id. 
25 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  In Katz, the Court noted that it is a 
well-established doctrine that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  The Court has been sure to reaffirm this basic principle 
whenever the occasion arises.  See Warden Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
298–300 (1967) (reiterating that absent exigent circumstances searches without a warrant 
are unreasonable per se); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59–62 (1967) (same); Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483, 486–87 (1964) (same); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613–
15 (1961) (same); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960) (same); Jones v. United 
States, 357 U.S. 493, 497–99 (1958) (same); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174–77 
(1949) (same); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454–56 (1948) (same); Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 (1925) (same).  Many exceptions to the warrant 
requirement have developed over the years, but have been, in theory, narrowly tailored 
and jealously drawn.  See generally Theodore P. Metzler et al., Thirtieth Annual Review of 
Criminal Procedure:  Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 89 GEO. L.J. 1084 (2001) (providing a 
detailed compilation and analysis of warrantless search and seizure jurisprudence).  These 
exceptions include, but are not limited to 
investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a 
valid arrest, seizure of items in plain view, exigent circumstances, 
consent searches, vehicle searches, container searches, inventory 
searches, border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and 
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Further, the Court has stressed that all searches should proceed only 
after issuance of a warrant by a neutral and detached magistrate.26  To be 
sure, the Fourth Amendment has two separate and interrelated clauses 
that coexist to protect citizens from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion:  the “Reasonableness Clause” and the “Warrant Clause.”27  
The Court has been careful to note that although the Fourth Amendment 
speaks broadly of unreasonable searches and seizures, the definition of 
“reasonableness” turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands 
of the Warrant Clause.28 
                                                                                                             
searches in which the special needs of law enforcement make the 
probable cause and warrant requirements impracticable. 
Id. at 1084.  Other more circumscribed exceptions include warrants to search “pervasively 
regulated business[es].” United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). This also includes 
warrants to search closely regulated industries “long subject to close supervision and 
inspection.”  Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).  One lower 
court has actually created an explicit list of exceptions to the warrant requirement.  See 
State v. Lara, 797 P.2d 296, 303 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that warrantless searches are 
permissible only if they fall within one of the following narrowly drawn exceptions to the 
warrant requirements:  “(1) plain view; (2) probable cause [accompanied by] exigent 
circumstances; (3) search incident to lawful arrest; (4) consent; (5) hot pursuit; and 
(6) inventory searches” (citing State v. Ruffino, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980))). 
26 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).  The Fourth Amendment’s 
protection consists in requiring that inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached 
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.  Id.; see also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 
(1981) (explaining that warrants are necessary because law enforcement “may lack 
sufficient objectivity to weigh correctly the strength of the evidence supporting the 
contemplated action”).  For instance, in Coolidge, the defendant was charged with murder 
and the chief investigator (and eventual prosecuting attorney), acting in his capacity as 
justice of the peace, issued a search warrant for defendant’s automobile.  Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971).  The Court found that the seizure and search of the 
automobile could not constitutionally rest upon the warrant issued by the state official who 
was not the “neutral and detached magistrate” required by the Constitution because the 
individual who issued the warrant was also the individual pursuing the case; therefore, the 
chief investigator/prosecuting attorney lacked the “neutral and detached” quality that is 
required by the Fourth Amendment.  Id. (quoting Jackson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–
14 (1948)). 
27 See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 302 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to 
the text of the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment); see also Kelly A. Borchers, Note, 
Mission Impossible:  Applying Arcane Fourth Amendment Precedent to Advanced Cellular Phones, 
40 VAL. U. L. REV. 223, 230–31 (2005) (detailing the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment 
and discussing the interplay between their distinct mandates and implications). 
28 Keith, 407 U.S. at 314–15.  This includes the fact that a warrant must be reasonable at 
the time it is issued.  Id.  In Chimel v. California, the Court considered the Government’s 
contention that the search be judged on a general “reasonableness” standard without 
reference to the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment.  395 U.S. 752, 764–65 (1969).  The 
Court concluded that such an argument was “founded on little more than a subjective view 
regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on considerations 
relevant to Fourth Amendment interests.”  Id.  The Court was deeply concerned that 
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The initial clause of the Fourth Amendment is known as the 
“Reasonableness Clause” and has been understood to state a 
comprehensive principle—the government shall not violate the “right to 
be secure” by conducting “unreasonable” searches and seizures.29  This 
portion of the Amendment explains who and what the Fourth 
Amendment envelopes (i.e., protection of “the people” and their 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects”).30  The latter portion of the 
Amendment is known as the “Warrant Clause” because it relates 
specifically to warrants and explains what a court requires before it 
issues a warrant.31 
1. The Warrant Requirement 
The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment contains two 
separate and independent standards:  (1) there must be probable cause 
for the warrant to be issued, and (2) the warrant must particularly 
                                                                                                             
“[u]nder such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this area would 
approach the evaporation point.”  Id. at 765.  The Court has also noted that the warrant 
requirement is far from superfluous language and has reiterated its value as a part of our 
constitutional law for decades.  Keith, 407 U.S. at 315–16; Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481.  It has 
emphatically noted that the warrant requirement is not a mere “inconvenience to be 
somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.”  Keith, 407 U.S. at 315 (quoting 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481).  “It is, or should be, an important working part of our machinery 
of government, operating as a matter of course to check the ‘well-intentioned but 
mistakenly over-zealous executive officers’ . . . of law enforcement.”  Id. at 315–16 (quoting 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481). 
29 Davies, supra note 21, at 557, 574.  Numerous commentaries discuss the fundamental 
meanings of the Fourth Amendment clauses, the interplay between them, and the inherent 
difficulties that arise when attempting to reconcile them.  Id.  For a more in-depth 
discussion, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 5–7 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter LAFAVE, TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT] (discussing the interaction between these two Fourth Amendment clauses). 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 6.01 (3d ed. 2002). 
31 See Borchers, supra note 27 (providing analysis as to how the Warrant and 
Reasonableness Clauses relate to one another).  The Warrant Clause requires that warrants 
should only be issued upon “probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation” and that 
the warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) 
(quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973)) (finding that although 
in certain limited circumstances a warrant is not required, “[t]he fundamental command of 
the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and . . . the 
requirement of a warrant bear[s] on the reasonableness of a search”); Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41, 86 (1967) (holding that searches and seizures are presumptively 
unconstitutional unless conducted pursuant to a valid warrant).  In Steele v. United States, 
the Court held that a warrant should describe the places to be searched and objects to be 
seized with sufficient particularity so as to leave nothing to the discretion of the officer 
executing the warrant.  267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). 
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describe who or what is to be seized.32  Initially, probable cause is an 
objective concept that attempts to circumscribe the power of the 
government in obtaining warrants by requiring, at minimum, a loose 
nexus between the alleged criminal activity, the items to be seized, and 
the place to be searched.33  The second requirement—the particularity 
requirement—provides that the warrant describe the places to be 
searched and objects to be seized with sufficient particularity so that 
officers may “with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place [or 
object] intended.”34  The degree of specificity required will vary with the 
specific facts of the case; nonetheless, the Supreme Court resolutely 
                                                 
32 Steele, 267 U.S. at 503; see also infra Part II.A.2 (providing an in-depth discussion of the 
particularity requirement). 
33 See generally Steele, 267 U.S. at 499–502 (recounting painstakingly the process by which 
an official obtains a warrant for probable cause).  Probable cause is viewed as a static 
concept due to its objective nature.  Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 951, 954–56 (2003).  Thus, no amount of subjective belief on behalf of law 
enforcement is sufficient to meet the standards of probable cause; there must exist 
“objective probable cause.”  DRESSLER, supra note 30, § 9.02; see also Whren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that a law enforcement official’s motives are not a factor 
when determining probable cause but are a factor when determining the reasonableness of 
a search, the extent of a search, or the manner in which a search was conducted).  For the 
purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the probable cause requirement has been met.  
Probable cause is considerably less of an issue in the context of Fourth Amendment cases 
involving the search and seizure of computer or digital evidence. 
34 Steele, 267 U.S. at 503; see also, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 150 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 
1998) (finding warrant sufficiently particular even though it contained directions that 
omitted the final turn because the surrounding property did not fit description of house in 
warrant); United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d 243, 249 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding warrant 
sufficiently particular although the first floor was not listed because affidavit supported 
conclusion that all three floors were under control of the target of the warrant); United 
States v. Gilliam, 975 F.2d 1050, 1055 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding warrant sufficiently particular 
although it contained an erroneous description of one of the farm’s boundaries because the 
warrant contained information that targeted the only farm in the vicinity and was thus 
sufficiently particular to avoid the risk of searching the wrong property); United States v. 
Dancy, 947 F.2d 1232, 1234 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding warrant sufficiently particular where it 
merely contained the correct street address).  But see, e.g., Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 
221 F.3d 425, 426 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding warrant insufficiently particular where it did not 
state items to be seized because attached exhibit listing items was sealed); United States v. 
Shamaeizadeh, 80 F.3d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding warrant insufficiently particular 
because officers had actual notice that the house was divided into two apartments prior to 
conducting search, yet failed to list the basement apartment); United States v. Dahlman, 13 
F.3d 1391, 1395–96 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding warrant insufficiently particular because 
location was identified by only two lot numbers within subdivision and without reference 
to structures on property); United States v. Ellis, 971 F.2d 701, 703–04 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(finding warrant insufficiently particular because it lacked a physical description of the 
premises, merely identifying it as the “third mobile home on the north side”); United States 
v. Nafzger, 965 F.2d 213, 215–16 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (finding warrant insufficiently 
particular because it identified locus of the search for a truck as “Western District of 
Wisconsin”). 
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advocates that officers must procure a warrant before conducting a 
search or seizure.35 
2. The Particularity Requirement 
The particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment serves two 
major functions:  (1) it informs the officers of what they are allowed to 
lawfully search and seize, and (2) it notifies the person who is being 
searched or seized of what the officers are lawfully allowed to take.36  
The particularity requirement is especially important in the context of 
digital evidence because it demarcates the boundaries of a given search.37  
                                                 
35 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (noting that the necessity of 
drawing Fourth Amendment exceptions as narrowly as possible “may appear unrealistic or 
‘extravagant’ to some.  But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental 
constitutional concepts,” and that “[i]n times not altogether unlike our own [our 
forefathers] won . . . a right of personal security against arbitrary [invasions] by official 
power”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasizing that the most basic 
constitutional norm in this area is “that searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment” and that such exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn); Gouled v. 
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303–04 (1921) (“It would not be possible to add to the emphasis 
with which the framers of our Constitution and this court have declared the 
importance . . . of the due observance of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution by 
[the Fourth Amendment].” (citations omitted)). 
36 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (holding that particular warrants 
ensure that the target of the search or seizure is aware of what police may search, their 
reasons for doing so, and the appropriate limits to the search); Hon. Robert H. Bohn, Jr. & 
Lynn S. Muster, The Dawn of the Computer Age:  How the Fourth Amendment Applies to 
Warrant Searches and Seizures of Electronically Stored Information, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. 
ADVOC. 63, 65 (2003).  A particular warrant also informs the individual subject to the search 
or seizure “of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits 
of his power to search.”  Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
at 9).  This also acts as a check on the administrative arm of the government.  See Maryland 
v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“By limiting the authorization to search to the specific 
areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that 
the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of 
the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.”). 
37 United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 759 (2d Cir. 1984).  A warrant is sufficiently 
particular if it “enable[s] the executing officer to ascertain and identify with reasonable 
certainty those items that the magistrate has authorized him to seize.”  United States v. 
George, 975 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1992). 
Courts tend to tolerate a greater degree of ambiguity where law 
enforcement agents have done the best that could reasonably be 
expected under the circumstances, have acquired all the descriptive 
facts which a reasonable investigation could be expected to cover, and 
have insured that all those facts were included in the warrant. 
United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 590 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Young, 745 F.2d at 759); see 
also United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Warrants which describe 
generic categories of items are not necessarily invalid if a more precise description of the 
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The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the interests served by 
the requirement suggest that it should be somewhat flexible and 
malleable, requiring reasonable specificity.38  In Katz v. United States, the 
Court determined that no discretion should be left to the executing 
officers; thus, even if officers act with restraint, the warrant may be 
found unconstitutional because the restraint is to be imposed by a 
neutral and detached magistrate rather than law enforcement officials.39 
                                                                                                             
items subject to seizure is not possible.”).  However, “[a] failure to describe the items to be 
seized with as much particularity as the circumstances reasonably allow offends the Fourth 
Amendment because there is no assurance that the permitted invasion of a suspect’s 
privacy and property are no more than absolutely necessary.”  George, 975 F.2d at 76. 
38 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Hon. Bohn, Jr. & Muster, supra note 36, at 
65 (2003); see also Steele, 267 U.S. at 503 (stating that the place to be searched must be 
described to such an extent that an officer can identify it by using only reasonable effort).  
Thus it is sufficiently particular to simply state the street address of a house that is to be 
searched, but more may be required if the location is a multi-unit complex.  See Garrison, 
480 U.S. at 80–81 (finding that where a search warrant specified the location of the search as 
“the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment” and two apartments 
actually existed at such address, the search warrant was not held invalid because officers 
“reasonably concluded that there was only one apartment on the third floor” based on 
objective facts).  The Supreme Court has found that the interests served by the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment are “to prevent general searches, to prevent the 
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another, and to prevent warrants from 
being issued on vague or dubious information.”  Groh, 540 U.S. at 560; see also Coolidge, 403 
U.S. at 467 (noting that the particularity requirement protects against “general, exploratory 
rummaging in a person’s belongings”).  Generally, warrants are found to be insufficiently 
particular where “[n]othing on the face of the warrant tells the searching officers for what 
crime the search is being undertaken.”  George, 975 F.2d at 76; see also United States v. 
Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1116 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding warrant lacked particularity where it did 
not describe “the possible crimes involved”); United States v. Hickey, 16 F. Supp. 2d 223, 
240 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (invalidating several warrants on particularity grounds where “none 
identified the nature of the suspected wrongdoing triggering the searches”); Roberts v. 
United States, 656 F. Supp. 929, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding warrant insufficiently 
particular where, among other omissions, the warrant contained “no restriction to any 
specific wrongful transaction to which the documents were related”), rev'd on other grounds, 
852 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1988). 
39 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 356 (holding that antecedent judicial authorization, not given in 
the instant case, was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance 
involved).  The Court in Katz took the opportunity again to stress that “[s]earches 
conducted without warrants have been held unlawful ‘notwithstanding facts 
unquestionably showing probable cause,’” that the “Constitution requires . . . [‘]the 
deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and 
the police,’” that “‘[o]ver and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the 
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,’ and that searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 357 (fourth alteration in original) 
(citations omitted).  See Groh, 540 U.S. at 560 (noting that the Warrant Clause’s main 
protection is that it has “interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. . . . so 
that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade [the searchee’s] privacy in order to 
enforce the law” (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1998))); see also 
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As well as struggling to find the right scope of particularity within 
the Fourth Amendment, courts have also struggled with the exact 
meaning of the terms “search” and “seizure” within the purview of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.40 
3. What Constitutes a “Seizure”? 
The Court has defined a seizure as a “meaningful interference with 
an individual’s possessory interests” in property.41  Thus, a seizure 
occurs when an officer removes or destroys property or when she 
secures the premises where property is located, because these actions 
meaningfully interfere with an individual’s property rights.42  Likewise, 
                                                                                                             
Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that a warrant may be valid if 
it describes the items to be seized in broad or generic terms and “when the description is as 
specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit” 
(quoting United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988))); United States v. Riley, 
906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Once a category of seizable papers has been adequately 
described, with the description delineated in part by an illustrative list of seizable items, 
the Fourth Amendment is not violated because the officers executing the warrant must 
exercise some minimal judgment . . . .”). 
40 Darla W. Jackson, Protection of Privacy in the Search and Seizure of E-Mail:  Is the United 
States Doomed to an Orwellian Future?, 17 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 97, 100, 102 (1999); see 
also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the 
meaning of the terms is “not remotely contained in the Constitution”); infra Part II.A.3 
(discussing the precise meaning of the terms “search” and “seizure” within the context of 
the Fourth Amendment). 
41 Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708–09 (1983) (finding that 
the term “seizure” signifies a meaningful interference with possessory interests or property 
rights); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (same); Chadwick, 433 
U.S. at 13–14, 14 n.8 (same); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (same).  Although the 
concept of a “seizure” of property is actually discussed fairly infrequently by the Court, its 
definition flows from “[the Court’s] oft-repeated definition of the ‘seizure’ of a person 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”  Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 n.5.  That is the 
“meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual’s freedom of movement.”  Id.; 
see also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981) (finding that a seizure implicates a 
meaningful interference with possessory or property interests); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 
438, 440 (1980) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551–54 
(1980) (Stewart, J.) (same); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (same); United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (same); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294–95 
(1973) (same); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726–27 (1969) (same); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 16, 19 n.16 (1968) (same). 
42 See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 60 (1992) (holding that, where a landlord 
chose to forcibly evict a tenant two weeks prior to the scheduled eviction hearing by 
removing and selling the tenants’ trailer, the seizure of the trailer implicated the tenant’s 
privacy and liberty interests that were protected under the Fourth Amendment because the 
eviction involved sufficient state action); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120–21 (holding that a seizure 
resulted where federal agents exhibited dominion over a white powdery substance found 
in the innermost of a series of four plastic bags that had also been concealed in a tube inside 
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due to a similar lack of interference, a seizure does not occur when an 
officer merely picks up and immediately sets down an object.43 
In United States v. Jacobsen, for instance, Federal Express employees, 
while inspecting a package that was damaged and torn by a forklift, 
encountered tubes containing plastic bags with white powder; they 
promptly returned the contents of the tube and notified the Drug 
Enforcement Administration.44  Upon arrival, a federal agent noticed the 
box, now re-wrapped, on the table with a hole; he removed the plastic 
bags from within and conducted a field test on the substance.45  The 
Court held that the officer’s “assertion of dominion and control over the 
package and its contents” qualified as a “seizure” for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.46  Conversely, in Arizona v. Hicks, where the 
investigating officers moved stereo equipment to view the serial number 
underneath, the Court held that no seizure occurred because the slight 
movement did not meaningfully affect the individual’s possessory 
interests.47  Thus, the Supreme Court has devised a logical and workable 
                                                                                                             
of a damaged package, but nonetheless allowing the warrantless seizure because it was not 
unreasonable); Place, 462 U.S. at 707–09 (holding that officials’ conduct constituted a 
“seizure” of traveler’s luggage when, following his refusal to consent to a search, a 
government agent told the traveler that he was going to take the luggage to a federal judge 
to procure a search warrant); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (holding that officer “seized” defendant 
and subjected him to a “search” when he took hold of him and patted down the outer 
surface of his clothing); Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the permanent taking of owner’s television set and substantial damage to her 
couch amounted to “seizure” under Fourth Amendment). 
43 See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (holding that where an officer was 
in a home pursuant to exigent circumstances—a bullet had been fired into it from the 
apartment below—and the officer moved some components of stereo equipment in order 
to read and record their serial numbers, a search but not a seizure had occurred for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 
44 466 U.S. at 111. 
45 Id. at 111–12. 
46 Id. at 120.  Likewise, and for the first time, the Supreme Court  unanimously held that 
during a traffic stop, a car and all of its occupants—not just the driver—are “seized” for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007).  Thus, 
the concept of a “meaningful interference” applies to both meaningful interference of 
property rights and the meaningful interference of the individual to move freely.  See id. at 
254 (noting that “[a] person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the 
government’s action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, ‘ ‘by means of 
physical force or show of authority,’ ’ terminates or restrains his freedom of movement” 
(citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991))). 
47 480 U.S. at 324.  The Court did, however, hold that the action taken by the officers was 
a “search” within the Fourth Amendment because such actions exposed to view previously 
concealed portions of the apartment and its contents, and produced a new invasion of 
privacy that was unjustified by the exigent circumstance validating the initial entry.  Id. at 
325. 
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definition of what constitutes a seizure for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.48 
B. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:  The Plain View Exception 
Although the text of the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures, it does not expressly require the government to 
obtain a warrant in order to conduct a search or seizure; nevertheless, the 
Court has held that warrantless searches and seizures are per se 
unreasonable unless justified by an exception.49  The rigidity with which 
the bounds of such exceptions should be drawn is debatable; however, it 
remains true that warrants are highly preferred.50  Nevertheless, over the 
                                                 
48 See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of “seizure” as a 
meaningful interference with the possessory interest of the individual or a meaningful 
interference of the individual’s freedom of movement). 
49 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also DRESSLER, supra note 30, §§ 12–
17 (providing a detailed and in-depth analysis of the jurisprudence surrounding the major 
exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment). 
50 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (holding that even when justified by probable cause, 
warrantless searches are unreasonable per se “subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions”).  The axiom that warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable absent exigent circumstances is oft-repeated in Fourth Amendment cases and 
is truly a cornerstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 
1710, 1716 (2009) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (quoting 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357)); Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 810 (2009) (“[U]nder this Court’s 
clearly established precedents, warrantless entries into a home are per se unreasonable 
[absent] exigent circumstances.”); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (“To the 
Fourth Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the warrantless entry of a person’s house as 
unreasonable per se, one ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ exception . . . [is] voluntary 
consent . . . .” (citations omitted) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958))); 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“[A] search conducted without a 
warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” (omission in original) (quoting 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (“[The Court requires] 
the judgment of a magistrate on the probable-cause issue and the issuance of a warrant 
before a search is made.  Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to 
probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.”); United States v. Jeffers, 
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (stating that “[o]nly where incident to a valid arrest, or in ‘exceptional 
circumstances,’ may an exemption lie” from judicial processes required by Fourth 
Amendment (citations omitted)); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) (“Belief, 
however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no 
justification for a search of that place without a warrant.”).  In order to avoid having to 
address the issue, some courts interpret even arguably narrow warrant language into 
broader discretionary language in the context of computer searches and seizures.  See 
United States v. Gleich, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (D.N.D. 2003) (holding that a search of 
three computers did not exceed the scope of a warrant because the warrant authorized a 
search and seizure of items that could contain “photographs, pictures, visual 
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years the Court has developed many exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.51  One exception that is frequently used and has become 
considerably recognized is a law enforcement official’s ability to seize an 
object of apparently incriminating nature without a warrant so long as it 
is in “plain view” and the official is lawfully present.52   Like “seizure,” 
“plain view” is a term of art that has substantial development within 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.53 
An object that is in “plain view” of a law enforcement official may be 
seized without a warrant if (1) the official views the object from a lawful 
                                                                                                             
representations, or videos in any form that include sexual conduct by a minor, as defined 
by [state statute]”); United States v. Musson, 650 F. Supp. 525, 532 (D. Colo. 1986) (holding 
narcotics agents did not exceed the scope of the warrant in seizing computer disks not 
described in the warrant because “in the age of modern technology and commercial 
availability of various forms of items, the warrant could not be expected to describe with 
exactitude the precise form the records would take” (quoting United States v. Reyes, 798 
F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1986))); People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 153–54 (Colo. 2001) (holding that 
laptop computers are “reasonably likely to serve as ‘containers' for writings, or the 
functional equivalent of ‘written or printed material’” and therefore fell within the scope of 
a warrant that authorized the search of written or printed material). 
51 See ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6 
(1992) (providing a comprehensive list—to the extent any list can be comprehensive in this 
area—and analyzing the relevant case law pertaining to the many exceptions to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment). 
52 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (enunciating, for the 
first time, the Court’s interpretation of the plain view doctrine).  The common thread 
among “plain view” cases is that the official in question had a previous justification for an 
intrusion or invasion and in the course of such he inadvertently came across a piece of 
incriminating evidence.  See id. at 466.  According to Coolidge, the plain view doctrine 
supplements the prior justification—whatever the reason—and allow for the seizure.  Id.  
The Court cautioned that the “original justification is legitimate only where it is 
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them,” and that the 
“‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one 
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.”  Id.  
53 See id. at 464–66 (carving out the intricacies of the plain view doctrine after discussing 
the similarities amongst lower court decisions and outlining the “circumstances in which 
plain view has legal significance rather than being simply the normal concomitant of any 
search, legal or illegal.”).  The Coolidge plurality opinion, which brought the inception of the 
plain view doctrine and is among the most cited cases in plain view jurisprudence, noted 
that under certain circumstances the police may lawfully seize evidence in plain view 
without a warrant, but that it is important to remember that “in the vast majority of cases, 
any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure,” 
and that the most difficult aspect of the doctrine “has been to identify the circumstances in 
which plain view has legal significance rather than being simply the normal concomitant of 
any search, legal or illegal.”  Id. at 465.  The Court further recognized that the particularity 
clause and the notion that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or 
seizure absent exigent circumstances prohibits use of the plain view doctrine on items for 
which officers have probable cause from the outset.  Id. at 464–65.  Consequently, the 
inadvertency requirement, to Justice Stewart, is merely a shorthand reference to existing 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  See id. 
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vantage point; (2) the official has a right of physical access to it; and (3) it 
is immediately apparent that the object is unlawful by its character or 
nature.54  Importantly, the doctrine does not serve as an exception to 
                                                 
54 Id. at 466.  Originally, the plain view exception contained the additional requirement 
that the officer also come across the evidence “inadvertently.”  Id. at 466–67.  The Court 
later trimmed this requirement from its plain view analysis.  See Horton v. California, 496 
U.S. 128, 137–38 (1990) (concluding that the inadvertence requirement of the plain view 
doctrine should no longer be analyzed as part of the application because it would be 
surplusage).  According to the Coolidge plurality opinion, the plain view doctrine is most 
generally applicable when “the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified 
objects, and in the course of the search [inadvertently] come across some other article of 
incriminating character.”  Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465; see also Horton, 496 U.S. at 137 (noting 
that “[the officer] must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself” in order to 
seize evidence pursuant to the plain view exception); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 
5–6 (1982) (noting that “[t]he ‘plain view’ exception . . . permits a law enforcement officer to 
seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place 
where the officer has a right to be” (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443)).  Interestingly, prior to 
Horton, each and every circuit court had issued a decision that cited the inadvertent 
requirement favorably.  E.g., United States v. Caggiano, 899 F.2d 99, 103 (1st Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Poulos, 895 F.2d 1113, 1121 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Barrios-
Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1989); Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 826 n.30 (5th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1512 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Peterson, 867 F.2d 1110, 1113 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Meyer, 827 F.2d 943, 945 (3d 
Cir. 1987); Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F.2d 930, 935 (10th Cir. 1987); Tarantino v. Baker, 
825 F.2d 772, 777 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Perry, 815 F.2d 1100, 1105 (7th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1551 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Search 
Warrant for Premises at 2125 S. Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C., 667 F.2d 117, 145 
(D.C. Cir. 1981).  Further, forty six of the fifty states had adopted the inadvertent discovery 
requirement as a part of Fourth Amendment plain view analysis.  See Horton, 496 U.S. at 
145 n.2 (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J., dissenting) (collecting cases) (“Only three States—
California, Idaho, and Utah—have rejected the inadvertent discovery requirement.”).  It is 
also interesting to note that California and Idaho are located within the Ninth Circuit, and 
Utah is within the Tenth Circuit—both having since adopted a view very similar to the 
inadvertent discovery requirement when the doctrine is applied to computer searches and 
seizures.  See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(holding that the government should completely forswear use of the plain view doctrine or 
any similar doctrine in the context of computer-based evidence cases), revised and superseded 
per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 
1275 n.7 (10th Cir. 1999) (implementing a “special approach” that inquires as to the 
subjective intent of the officer at the time of the plain view sighting).  Moreover, even the 
courts that have not adopted the inadvertent discovery requirement have concluded that 
the government may not engage in pretextual searches—a concept intimately related to 
inadvertent discovery.  See State v. Bussard, 760 P.2d 1197, 1204 n.2 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) 
(holding that an officer who enters area pursuant to a warrant to search for evidence of one 
crime when he is really interested only in seizing evidence relating to another crime for 
which he does not have a warrant, has engaged in a “pretextual” search and the fruits of 
that search should be suppressed); State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 n.1 (Utah 1986) (holding 
the same). 
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Fourth Amendment searches but rather serves to justify seizures of 
incriminating evidence that is in plain view.55 
The initial requirement for the seizure of evidence in plain view is 
that the officer must be lawfully present when she views the evidence.56  
Most evidence seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine is seized either 
(1) during the execution of a valid search warrant, or (2) during a search 
justified by an exception to the warrant requirement.57  The second 
requirement under plain view analysis requires that the official have a 
lawful right of access to the object.58  The third and final requirement is 
                                                 
55 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 (noting that “[t]he doctrine serves to supplement the prior 
justification . . . and permits the warrantless seizure”).  The Court was careful to note, 
however, that the extension of the prior justification is legitimate only where it is 
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them.  Id.  The plain 
view doctrine, according to the Court, cannot be used “to extend a general exploratory 
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.”  Id. 
56 Horton, 496 U.S. at 136. 
57 Id. at 135.  Suppose, for instance, that police obtain a valid warrant to search 
defendant’s home based on probable cause that she was involved in a homicide, and 
therein they find marijuana strewn across the coffee table.  The plain view doctrine would 
allow the seizure of the marijuana—although a strict reading of the Fourth Amendment 
would not allow it—because the amendment recognizes that the delay, inconvenience, and 
risk of destruction of evidence require the procurement of a warrant.  See BLOOM & BRODIN, 
supra note 51, § 6.8 (1992) (providing essentially the same hypothetical example).  The 
officer is allowed to seize the contraband without obtaining a warrant because, among 
other things, she was lawfully present pursuant to a valid search warrant, which satisfies 
the first prong of the plain view inquiry.  See id.  Suppose instead that the police did not 
have a valid warrant to search the home, but the defendant consented to their entry and 
they subsequently found the drugs.  The police could likewise seize the evidence because 
they were lawfully present pursuant to a well recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement—consent.  See id.  Suppose now, however, that the searching officers do not 
enter the house pursuant to a valid warrant or exception to the warrant requirement, but 
are merely conducting their routine foot patrol of the neighborhood when they observe the 
marijuana lying on the coffee table through an open window.  The officers would not be 
able to enter the home and seize the contraband absent a warrant because the plain view 
requirement will only authorize the seizure after the officers have lawfully entered the 
premises.  See id.  The plain view doctrine will not provide the justification for the initial 
entry upon the premises.  Id. 
58 BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 51, § 6.8.  Bloom and Brodin also state that this 
requirement mandates that the object be “observed while the officer is confining her 
activities to the permissible scope of [the initial] intrusion.”  Id.; see also Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 
468 (noting that even where the evidence is in plain view, the “Court has repeatedly stated 
and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter [private premises] and make a 
warrantless seizure”).  In Washington v. Chrisman, a police officer arrested the defendant for 
possessing alcohol as a minor and asked for his identification.  455 U.S. at 3.  The defendant 
responded that his identification was in his room but that the officer could accompany him 
while he went to retrieve it.  Id.  As the defendant entered his dorm room to obtain his 
identification, the officer leaned against the doorjam and waited.  Id. at 5–7.  From the 
doorway the officer noticed seeds and a pipe lying on the desk inside the room, and from 
his training was quite sure they were marijuana related.  Id.  The officer seized the evidence 
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that the criminal nature of the evidence must be “immediately 
apparent.”59  This third prong plays a vital role in determining whether 
evidence may be seized pursuant to the plain view exception to the 
warrant requirement.60  Although no longer an element of plain view 
                                                                                                             
and the defendant appealed alleging that the officer had no right to access the drugs within 
his room.  Id.  The Court held that the officer had a right to accompany the arrestee to his 
room closely and keep an eye on him at all times.  Id.  Therefore, the Court reasoned that 
because the officer was lawfully present at his vantage point (i.e., the doorway) he had a 
right to seize the evidence.  Id. at 9.  The Court noted that this was “a classic instance of 
incriminating evidence found in plain view when a police officer, for unrelated but entirely 
legitimate reasons, obtains lawful access to an individual’s area of privacy,” and that “[t]he 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit seizure of evidence of criminal conduct found in 
these circumstances.”  Id.  The dissent took a different approach, claiming that although the 
officer had a right to stand in the doorway to keep an eye on the arrestee, he did not have 
the same right to enter the room for the purpose of investigating his suspicion about the seeds 
and pipe.  Id. at 10–11 (White, J. dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.).  The Court 
expressly distinguished the officer’s right to be present in the doorway from an officer that 
might have merely been passing through the hallway while the defendant’s door was open 
stating “[t]he circumstances of this case distinguish it significantly from one in which an 
officer, who happens to pass by chance an open doorway to a residence, observes what he 
believes to be contraband inside.”  Id. at 9 n.5; see also, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 585–89 (1980) (holding that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the 
police from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to make a 
routine felony arrest because such an arrest was an invasion of the sanctity of the home, 
absent exigent circumstances, even when it was accomplished under statutory authority 
and when probable cause was present); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948) 
(holding that where police smelled opium from outside a door, the warrantless arrest and 
search violated the Fourth Amendment even though officers may have had probable cause 
to obtain a search warrant because no exigent circumstances existed and the inconvenience 
and slight delay in preparing papers and presenting the evidence to a magistrate does not 
justify bypassing the warrant requirement). 
59 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).  In Dickerson, the Supreme Court 
explained that the incriminating nature of an object is immediately apparent if police have 
probable cause to believe an object in plain view is contraband.  Id.  To illustrate, in 
Coolidge, law enforcement officials seized defendant’s car from his driveway because they 
thought it might implicate him in a crime.  403 U.S. at 446.  Upon a microscopic search of 
the vehicle the police found incriminating evidence, but because the criminal nature of the 
evidence was not “immediately apparent”—that is, the police had to employ extrinsic 
means to establish the criminal nature of the evidence—the Court held the seizure to be 
invalid.  Id. at 472–74.  Likewise, in Arizona v. Hicks, the police entered the defendant’s 
apartment pursuant to a valid search warrant and while inside moved a piece of stereo 
equipment to see the serial number underneath, later confirming via the number that the 
equipment was stolen.  480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987).  The Court found the search was 
unconstitutional because the serial number was not “immediately apparent” as the 
equipment had to be moved before it was able to be viewed.  Id. 
60 See David S. Ziff, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution of Computer Searches 
Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 841, 868–70 & n.198 (2005) (discussing 
the importance of the “immediately apparent” requirement in plain view analysis).  
However, some courts have been willing to apply the “immediately apparent” requirement 
in a less than strict manner.  See, e.g., United States v. Khabeer, 410 F.3d 477, 482 (8th Cir. 
2005) (allowing, under the plain view exception, receipts and identity documents beyond 
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analysis, the Court once held that the evidence seized pursuant to the 
plain view doctrine had to be found inadvertently.61  Regardless, it is 
important to remember that the plain view exception, by itself, will never 
justify an entry onto private premises.62 
1. Digital Evidence Creates Novel Difficulties 
Unlike the “papers” and “effects” that the Framers of the Fourth 
Amendment originally contemplated, computers and other devices that 
store digital evidence can hold an enormous amount of data.63  
Moreover, people use computers for almost everything imaginable—
from storing videos, pictures, and personal records to corresponding 
with individuals worldwide.64  Although computer and digital data is in 
                                                                                                             
the scope of the warrant in a fraud case); United States v. Calle, No. 98-50377, 1999 WL 
313361 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 1999) (holding travel documents admissible under the plain view 
exception because the officer read the documents and saw that the dates on them were 
inconsistent with defendant’s prior statements); United States v. Calloway, 116 F.3d 1129, 
1133 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding notes, bank receipts, and power of attorney found during 
search for other types of documents evidencing aircraft piracy admissible under plain view 
exception). 
61 See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467–471 & n.26 (holding that inadvertent discovery is 
necessary to plain view analysis because it is the logical manifestation of the Fourth 
Amendment’s explicit constitutional  protections:  (1) that a magistrate’s detached probable 
cause determination is mandatory, and (2) that searches and seizures deemed necessary are 
as narrow and limited as possible); see also supra notes 52–54 (discussing the initial 
implementation and subsequent tailoring of the inadvertent discovery requirement).  
Justice Stewart’s opinion deemed that if the Court is going to allow warrantless seizures of 
evidence in plain view, the inadvertent discovery requirement is a necessary limitation to 
such an exception.  Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468.  Justice Stewart concluded that the first 
limitation on the doctrine is that plain view alone is never enough to justify a seizure 
because absent exigent circumstances there exists no rational basis for excusing the 
warrantless seizure; and, second, that the discovery of evidence must be inadvertent 
because where police know in advance of the evidence and intend to seize it, they should 
obtain a warrant particularly describing it.  Id. at 468–69.  Thus, the inadvertent discovery 
requirement, according to Justice Stewart, was the logical manifestation of the warrant 
requirement and the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  See id. at 467–71. 
62 See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469 (“[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the 
warrantless seizure of evidence.  This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle 
discussed above, that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or 
seizure absent ‘exigent circumstances.’”). 
63 See United States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The risk of 
exposing intimate (and innocent) correspondence to prying eyes is magnified because 
‘[c]omputers . . . often contain significant intermingling of relevant documents with 
documents that the government has no probable cause to seize.’” (omission in original) 
(quoting United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041, at *35 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007))). 
64 See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(“Electronic storage and transmission of data is no longer a peculiarity or luxury of the 
very rich; it’s a way of life.”), revised and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) 
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some ways comparable to traditional physical evidence, inherent 
differences make any straight-forward comparison troubling.65  The 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, suggested 
that the problem is stated quite simply as follows:  “There is no way to 
be sure exactly what an electronic file contains without somehow 
examining its contents—either by opening it and looking, using 
specialized forensic software, keyword searching or some other such 
technique.”66  Further, relevant electronic files are stored on media along 
with, at times, millions of other files.67  By necessity, then, government 
efforts to locate particular evidence will require examination of many 
irrelevant files to ensure that the desired data is not overlooked or 
hidden.68 
Some courts have likened computers to file cabinets or other closed 
containers and applied existing Fourth Amendment case law to 
                                                                                                             
(en banc); United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Computers are 
simultaneously file cabinets . . . and locked desk drawers; they can be repositories 
of . . . deeply personal information, but also of evidence of crimes. . . . As society grows 
ever more reliant on computers . . . courts will be called upon to analyze novel legal issues 
and develop new rules within . . . Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
65 See United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Because computers can 
hold so much information touching on many different areas of a person’s life, there is a 
greater potential for the ‘intermingling’ of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy 
when police execute a search for evidence on a computer.”); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. 
Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998) (“With their unparalleled ability to store and process 
information, computers are increasingly relied upon by individuals in their work and 
personal lives.  Computer searches present [similar problems]—the intermingling of 
relevant and irrelevant material—but to a heightened degree.”); see also Orin S. Kerr, Digital 
Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 280 (2005) (arguing that 
new dynamics of computer crime should result in the creation of new doctrines that 
“impose some new restrictions on police conduct”). 
66 Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1004; see also Walser, 275 F.3d at 986 (“The 
advent of the electronic age and . . . the development of desktop computers that are able to 
hold the equivalent of a library’s worth of information, go beyond the established 
categories of constitutional doctrine.  Analogies to other physical objects, such as dressers 
or file cabinets, do not often inform the situations we now face as judges when applying 
search and seizure law.”).  Commentators have likened computer files to storage containers 
and plastic bags and suggested that requiring the police to rely on the file names is similar 
to requiring police to rely on a plastic bag labeled “talcum powder” or “flour.”  See Thomas 
K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures:  A Perspective and 
a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 207–10 (2005–06) (citing United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 
1081, 190–91 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). 
67 See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, Chicago, Illinois 60621, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 959 
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (“Even a modest home computer today frequently has 512 megabytes of 
memory (if not more), which translates into capacity of 256,000 pages of information.”). 
68 See United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing the 
problems with ex ante search protocols for searching computers and noting that “[g]iven 
the numerous ways information is stored on a computer, openly and surreptitiously, a 
search can be as much an art as a science”). 
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determine whether the police lawfully seized evidence related to the 
warrant.69  Others have suggested a special approach is necessary and 
that a judge or magistrate should become heavily involved in the scope 
of the warrant, describing with the utmost detail precisely which files 
should be searched and, to some extent, how to go about searching 
them.70  These two approaches have emerged as the leading views as to 
how the plain view doctrine should apply in computer evidence cases.71 
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Direct “Special Approach” 
In United States v. Tamura, the Ninth Circuit first addressed the issue 
of how to handle the search and seizure of intermingled physical files—a 
concept intimately related to computer evidence searches.72  The court 
                                                 
69 For the purpose of this Note, this will be referred to as the “container theory” or 
“container approach.”  Courts adhering to this approach have generally looked to 
traditional Fourth Amendment principles—such as probable cause and particularity—in 
limiting the scope of a particular search or seizure.  See United States v. Gleich, 293 F. Supp. 
2d 1082, 1088 (D.N.D. 2003), aff’d, 397 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that the warrant 
authorizing search of computer for photographs, pictures, visual representations, or videos 
that included sexual conduct by a minor, as defined by the state statute, met the 
particularity requirement and also finding that the warrant authorizing the search of the 
home permitted a search of all three computers in the house); United States v. Campos, 221 
F.3d 1143, 1147–48 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding warrant sufficiently particular when it 
authorized, among other things, seizure of computer equipment that may have been used 
to depict or distribute child pornography); United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st 
Cir. 1999) (upholding a warrant issued for “[a]ny and all computer software and 
hardware, . . . computer disks, disk drives” in the home of a woman suspected of child 
pornography (omissions in original)); United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 996–99 (7th Cir. 
1998) (holding that the particularity requirement was satisfied when items listed in a 
warrant qualified that the items sought were related to child pornography); State v. Wible, 
51 P.3d 830, 837 (Wash Ct. App. 2002) (finding that a warrant was sufficiently particular 
when it limited the search to images of children engaged in sexually explicit activity as 
defined by state statute). 
70 See infra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing the special approaches to the plain view exception as 
applied to computer evidence cases, as well as the closed-container analogy and other 
various theories). 
71 See United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 943–49 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (recognizing that 
“neither the Fifth Circuit nor the United States Supreme Court have developed precedent 
specifically addressing the scope of a search for digital evidence,” and that “the Ninth 
Circuit has the most robust body of law on the subject matter,” and subsequently 
examining—in distinct and separate sections of the opinion—the approach that the Ninth 
and Tenth Circuits have taken to reconcile plain view analysis with digital evidence); see 
also infra Part III.B–C (discussing the positive and negative aspects of each of the 
approaches). 
72 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).  In Tamura, the defendant was involved in a bribery 
scandal and officers entered Tamura’s business subject to a warrant that authorized them 
to find and seize various business records.  Id. at 594.  The police were permitted to seize 
the following:  (1) records of contracts for the sale of cable during a four and one-half year 
period, (2) records of payments during the same four and one-half year period, and 
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began by noting that while all items in a set of files may be inspected 
during a search—provided the warrant offers sufficiently specific 
guidelines for identifying the relevant documents—a wholesale seizure 
of all relevant documents is considerably more intrusive.73  The court 
(1) determined that a valid search warrant described all of the seized 
documents introduced at trial; (2) noted that in the future, when dealing 
with documents that are so intermingled they cannot feasibly be sorted 
on site, the government should seek the judgment of a neutral and 
detached magistrate; and (3) stated that the government “generally can 
                                                                                                             
(3) records of travel for a similar time period.  Id.  When the original means of collecting 
data became overly burdensome, the employees of the company refused to cooperate, and 
the agents confiscated all of the records for the time period in question regardless of their 
relevance.  Id. at 595.  To find the relevant records in the accounting department, the agents 
had to perform three steps:  (1) review a computer printout; (2) locate the voucher that 
corresponded to a particular payment recorded on the printout; and (3) find the check that 
corresponded to the voucher.  Id. at 594–95.  In all, the officials seized eleven cardboard 
boxes of computer printouts, which were bound in 2000-page volumes; thirty-four file 
drawers of vouchers, also bound in 2000-page volumes; and seventeen drawers of 
cancelled checks, which were bundled into files.  Id.  The agents hauled all these records to 
another location, where they sifted through them and extracted the relevant documents.  Id.  
The defendant did not contest the validity of the search warrant; he challenged only the 
scope of the seizure.  Id.  Notably, when the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Andresen 
v. Maryland, the Court held that inevitably “innocuous” documents can be “cursorily” 
examined.  427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).  Other courts have set forth guidelines for 
governmental review of commingled records to find documents that fall within the scope 
of a warrant.  See, e.g., United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (allowing 
for a “brief perusal” of each document, and requiring that “the perusal must cease at the 
point at which the warrant’s inapplicability to each document is clear”); see also United 
States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1551–53 (9th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that officers may “peruse 
each document to determine whether it relate[s] to other fraudulent activity,” but finding 
that where it was “readily apparent” that certain documents were beyond the scope of the 
warrant and agents were “immediately alerted” to that fact, the Fourth Amendment was 
likely violated); United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 577 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that 
“the police may look through . . . file cabinets, files and similar items and briefly peruse 
their contents to determine whether they are among the documentary items to be seized”); 
United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 604 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding government agents did 
not act unlawfully where they “merely examined documents . . . to determine if the 
documents might in some manner relate to [certain] transactions” that were described in 
the warrant); United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1257 n.8 (2d. Cir. 1979) (holding valid 
government action described as “some perusal, generally fairly brief”).  If a document falls 
outside the warrant but nonetheless is incriminating, the Heldt theory allows that 
document’s “seizure” only if during that brief perusal the document’s “otherwise 
incriminating character becomes obvious.”  Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1267. 
73 Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595.  The court also noted that an indiscriminate seizure does not 
comply with the Fourth Amendment especially when files are not timely returned once 
segregated.  Id.  To summarize Tamura, the government was attempting to search for a 
single document hidden somewhere in many boxes of documents.  Id. at 596.  Rather than 
search through the boxes and seize only the one document, investigators carted off all the 
documents to search them off-site at a later time.  Id. at 596–97. 
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avoid violating [F]ourth [A]mendment rights by sealing and holding the 
documents pending approval by a magistrate of a further search.”74  The 
Ninth Circuit ultimately enunciated a two prong analysis to solve the 
problem of intermingled documents:  (1) the government should be 
allowed to seize all intermingled documents, regardless of relevance, in 
order to remove them from the suspect’s control; and (2) the government 
should then be required to appear before a neutral and detached 
magistrate who can issue a second warrant that sets the conditions and 
limits of the file search.75 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit was also the first—and, as of the date of 
this Note, the only—circuit to directly consider the application of the 
plain view doctrine specifically in the context of computer evidence cases 
in United States v. Wong.76  In Wong, a Ninth Circuit panel determined 
                                                 
74 Comprehensive Drug Testing II, 513 F.3d 1085, 1107 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Tamura, 694 
F.2d at 595–96). 
75 Tamura, 694 F.2d at 591.  The Tamura court’s proposed solution to the intermingled 
document problem essentially had two elements.  Id. at 596.  First, officers should be 
allowed to seize all the intermingled documents in question—regardless of relevance—thus 
removing them from the defendant’s control.  Id.  Then, after the initial seizure, the 
government should be required to go before a neutral and detached magistrate who would 
issue a second warrant and determine the “conditions and limitations” for inspecting the 
large quantities of computer data.  Id. at 597 n.3. 
76 334 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2003).  In Wong, the defendant called police and notified them 
that his live-in girlfriend had been missing for several days.  Id. at 833–34.  Wong initially 
told police that he and Sin were married, when in fact, they were not.  Id.  Sin was pregnant 
at the time of her disappearance, a fact Wong did not tell police until days after he reported 
her missing.  Id.  Investigating officers discovered Sin’s car a half-mile from Wong’s home, 
ascertained that Wong and Sin had been fighting prior to her disappearance, found a 
handgun during a consensual search of Wong’s home, and learned that shortly after Sin’s 
disappearance Wong’s other girlfriend and mother of his child, Jennifer, had moved into 
the house with Wong.  Id.  Police ultimately discovered Sin’s body in Nevada with four 
bullet holes in it, as well as bullet casings that appeared to match the gun found in Wong’s 
home and monopoly money marked with “NWO” and “ZOG” (letters commonly used by 
white supremacy groups) next to it.  Id. at 834.  Upon discovering this information, police 
officials presented to the magistrate judge a search warrant, affidavit, and statement of 
probable cause to search Wong’s house, cars, and computer.  Id.  The search warrant 
limited the seizure to items used to commit a felony, evidence that tended to show a felony 
had been committed, or evidence that a particular person committed the felony, and also 
specified that officers would be looking for any effects containing information about the 
white supremacist letters or the county in Nevada where the body was found, and any 
other effects belonging to Sin.  Id.  The warrant issued, and the police collected many 
things, including the computers.  Id.  A special agent was called in to gather information 
from the computers; he determined that information regarding the firearms, felonies, the 
white supremacist letters, and the county in Nevada could be located by searching plain 
text, special text, or graphics files.  Id. at 835.  In particular, the specialist thought that maps 
of the county in Nevada, and depictions of Monopoly money and the white supremacist 
letters, might be found on the computer and those would likely be found in graphic files.  
Id.  After the specialist began his search, he located graphic files containing child 
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that a search warrant was sufficiently particular and was supported by 
probable cause; however, as the court noted, the government still had to 
establish the requisite elements of the plain view doctrine.77  Because the 
computer specialist determined the items listed in the search warrant 
could be located in plain text, special text, or graphic files on the 
computer, and because the police found the child pornography files 
while searching for evidence of the homicide, the court found that the 
police were lawfully present at their vantage point.78 
The Ninth Circuit recently had a chance to refine its position as to 
how the plain view exception should apply in computer-based evidence 
cases, as well as how the intermingled documents problem might best be 
solved in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.79  In 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, the government obtained a search warrant to 
search the computer files of Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., for the 
names and test results of ten specified major league baseball players.80  
                                                                                                             
pornography; he made note of their location and continued his search for evidence relating 
to the homicide.  Id.  In addition to searching the house and the car, one item on the 
warrant sought to search Wong’s computers, their components, and disks to “obtain data 
as it relates to this case.”  Id. at 834.  Specifically, the warrant list included any writings, 
documents, maps, or receipts depicting or relating to Churchill County, Nevada; and 
“[a]ny and all identification and documents belonging to [the murder victim].”  Id. at 837. 
77 Id. at 838.  The Ninth Circuit panel further recognized that in order “[t]o satisfy the 
plain view doctrine:  (1) the officer must be lawfully in the place where the seized item was 
in plain view; (2) the item’s incriminating nature was ‘immediately apparent’; and (3) the 
officer had ‘a lawful right of access to the object itself.’”  Id. (citing Horton v. California, 496 
U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990)).  The Wong court found that, pursuant to a valid search warrant, 
the officer had determined the items listed in the search warrant that could be located on 
computer files could be found in plain text, special text, or graphic files.  Id.  While 
searching the graphics files for evidence of murder, as allowed by the warrant, the officer 
discovered pictures of children as young as age three engaged in sexual acts.  Id.  The 
incriminating nature of the files was immediately apparent to the officer.  Id.  Because the 
police were lawfully searching for evidence of murder in the graphics files and 
inadvertently located the incriminating child pornography, the evidence was properly 
admitted under the plain view doctrine.  Id. at 838–39. 
78 Id.  The court also found that the incriminating nature of the files was immediately 
apparent to the specialist since they depicted children as young as three engaged in sexual 
acts; therefore, the court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted under the 
plain view doctrine.  Id. at 839. 
79 Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), revised and 
superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
80 Id. at 993–94.  The warrant had an introduction that painstakingly chronicled the need 
for the government to search all of the files because of the tendency of wrongdoers to 
attempt to disguise and hide files, or even set up booby-traps that will destroy the 
information if triggered.  Id. at 1002.  Therefore, the government claimed they needed to sift 
through each of the files independently and prudently.  Id. at 1003–06.  The court aptly 
recognized, however, that this will be the case in all digital and computer evidence cases, 
and held that in the future the government must disclose the actual possibility of these 
dangers as opposed to the ever-present danger in the abstract.  Id. at 1006.  Many of the 
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During the search of the computers, the government arguably violated 
certain terms of the search warrant by “perus[ing]” through all of the 
computer files of the company without regard for whether the files 
pertained to the ten specified players.81  The government argued that it 
complied with the standard set forth in Tamura, but it was not required 
to return the additional evidence because it was obtained “in plain 
view.”82 
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, found that the government acted 
with callous disregard for the warrant requirements issued by the 
magistrate by browsing all of the computers files and set out a series of 
guidelines that should be used in subsequent digital evidence cases.83  
The en banc court reasoned that Tamura imported procedures to 
maintain “privacy of materials that are intermingled with seizable 
materials, and to avoid turning a limited search . . . into a general 
search.”84  The court suggested that warrants should contain language or 
                                                                                                             
judges in the lower courts of this case indicated that they felt exceedingly misled by the 
government’s actions.  Id. at 1005–06.  For instance, one of the judges issuing a warrant 
asked “what ever happened to the Fourth Amendment?  Was it . . . repealed somehow?”  
Id. at 1005. 
81 Id. at 999.  The Major League Baseball Players Association agreed that players would 
submit urine samples solely for determining the percentage of positive results; all results 
were to remain confidential.  Id.  But when ten players tested positive, the government 
obtained warrants and issued subpoenas to obtain information from private entities who 
collected the samples and information.  Id. at 997.  The warrants were limited to 
information on the ten players, but the government seized information on many others, 
including athletes from other professional sports.  Id. at 998.  The government also issued 
subpoenas for the same information.  Id.  The lower courts granted the players’ motions to 
quash and to return seized property.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, determined 
that the government was not able to rely on the plain view doctrine or any similar doctrine 
to justify the seizure of the information.  Id. at 999. 
82 Id. at 997.  A panel of the Ninth Circuit decided the case initially and ruled that the 
government lawfully obtained the evidence pursuant to the warrant; this opinion was 
subsequently withdrawn and superseded by a second panel decision that concluded 
ultimately the same. 
83 See id. at 1006 (providing a synopsis of the guidelines that the court employs during 
the course of its decision). 
84 Id. at 998.  The court further suggested that if the government cannot be sure whether 
data can be erased, concealed, or destroyed without examining every file, then every file 
the government comes into contact with will necessarily come into plain view.  Id.  
Additionally, if the government is the entity that decides how much evidence will be taken 
from the site, it creates a powerful incentive for the government to overestimate the 
amount of evidence needed or simply lead to a seizure of “more rather than less.”  Id.  The 
court illustrated the possible thought process aptly with the following hypothetical excerpt: 
Why stop at the list of all baseball players when you can seize the 
entire . . . Directory?  Why just that directory and not the entire hard 
drive?  Why just this computer and not the one in the next room and 
the next room after that?  Can't find the computer?  Seize the Zip disks 
under the bed in the room where the computer once might have been.  
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protocol that prevents over-seizure of data, such as employing separate 
search personnel trained specifically with computers or using specialized 
hashing equipment.85  And perhaps most notably, the court further 
mandated that when the government obtains search warrants, it should 
forswear use of the “plain view” doctrine in electronic evidence cases; if 
the government refuses to do so, district courts should require it or deny 
the warrant altogether.86 
The Ninth Circuit concluded by recognizing that wrongdoers “have 
obvious incentives to make data difficult to find” and that the 
government has a legitimate need to sift through some information 
carefully for disguised pieces of evidence, but that such a pressing need 
by law enforcement cannot justify every search warrant for computer 
evidence becoming, in effect, a general warrant to search every piece of 
information therein.87  The court attempted to create clear rules that 
                                                                                                             
Let’s take everything back to the lab, have a good look around and see 
what we might stumble upon. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
85 Id. at 996.  The court suggested that the personnel could either be employed through 
the police force or government, or they could be privately contracted.  Id.  The court also 
suggested that in certain cases, the personnel to sort the files should be appointed by the 
judicial officer in charge of issuing the warrant.  Id.  In December 2009, for instance, a 
district court within the Ninth Circuit determined that the search protocol provided by the 
warrant—including that the government could only remove an electronic device from the 
search location if it could not be searched reasonably on-site and that the government had 
to complete an off-site search no later than thirty calendar days after the initial execution of 
the warrant and had to return the device within thirty calendar days after the search.  
United States v. Cerna, No. CR 08-0730, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122847, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
21, 2009).  The protocol also required the government to make “all reasonable efforts” to 
use methods and procedures that minimized exposure of irrelevant, privileged, or 
confidential files.  Id.  The district court concluded that the protocol “was sufficiently 
tailored to meet the criteria established in Comprehensive Drug Testing.”  Id. 
86 Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d. at 998–99.  The majority and dissenting 
opinions quarreled over the relevance of the “plain view” doctrine in such cases and 
whether allowing the doctrine created a free-for-all of “general” searches when computers 
are involved.  See id. (suggesting that if the government can apply the plain view doctrine 
in the context of digital searches and seizures it effectively risks the privacy of the entire 
American populace).  “To avoid this illogical result,” the majority opinion also suggested 
that the government should forswear reliance on “any similar doctrine that would allow it 
to retain data to which it has gained access only because it was required to segregate 
seizable from non-seizable data.”  Id.  But see United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 
2009 WL 4728690, at *6 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2009) (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit approach is 
perhaps misguided because it presumes police misconduct is the rule, rather than the 
exception). 
87 Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1004  The court was clearly taken aback by 
the actions of the government and wondered what the bounds might be in the future, 
noting that authorization to search some computer files, by virtue of the government’s 
reliance on the plain view exception, automatically becomes authorization to search all of 
the files “in the same subdirectory, and all files in an enveloping directory, a neighboring 
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struck a fair balance between individual and law enforcement interests, 
and felt the need “to update Tamura to apply to the daunting realities of 
electronic searches.”88 
After the court issued its original en banc decision in Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, several parties to the litigation, including the Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”), requested that the Ninth Circuit rehear the case by a 
“Full Court.”89  The Ninth Circuit ultimately denied the requests for 
rehearing en banc by the full court90 and instead opted to issue a per 
curiam opinion that would revise and supersede the original en banc 
                                                                                                             
hard drive, a nearby computer or nearby storage media.”  Id. at 1005.  And where 
computers happen not to be near one another, but are connected electronically, “the 
original search might justify examining files in computers many miles away, on a theory 
that incriminating electronic data could have been shuttled and concealed there.”  Id.  
Concerning the majority even more is perhaps the development of web-based e-mail 
accounts, picture sharing sites, slideshows, computer codes, etc., that store messages, 
pictures, or other data “along with billions of other messages from and to millions of other 
people.”  Id.  Therefore, the court concluded that under the government’s formulation of 
the plain view exception, seizure of Google’s e-mail servers “to look for a few incriminating 
messages could jeopardize the privacy of millions.”  Id. 
88 Id. at 1006.  On the other hand, courts adhering to the closed container approach to 
computers—or at least those opting to insist on adherence to the common law approach of 
reasoned decisionmaking based solely on the facts at hand—have simply applied existing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine to the searches of computers.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 863 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a warrant that “permitted the 
officers to search for anything—from child pornography to tax returns to private 
correspondence,” was “precisely the kind of ‘wide-ranging exploratory search[] that the 
Framers intended to prohibit’” (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987))); 
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[O]fficers [should] specify in a 
warrant which type of files are sought.”); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 584–
85 (D. Vt. 1998) (invalidating a warrant for failure to identify with particularity the 
underlying information to be seized); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 
15, 1993, 846 F. Supp. 11, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding in the context of a grand jury 
subpoena that specificity is required with respect to the categories of information 
requested, not merely the storage devices). 
89 See Orin Kerr, DOJ Files Brief Supporting Super-En-Banc in CDT, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Nov. 24, 2009, 1:26 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/11/24/doj-files-brief-supporting-super-
en-banc-in-cdt.  The brief filed on behalf of the Justice Department—signed by many of the 
highest ranking attorneys in the DOJ—criticized the original en banc panel for having 
articulated such “sweeping new rules,” noted that the government had never asked for—
and the Ninth Circuit had never granted—en banc review by the full court, and ultimately 
sought rescission of the original opinion or, alternatively, a chance to brief the court on the 
repercussions of the new protocol.  See id. 
90 See Musetta Durkee, Ninth Circuit Relaxes Electronic Search Procedures in United States 
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing Rehearing, BOLT (Sept. 28, 2010), 
http://btlj.org/2010/09/28/ninth-circuit-relaxes-electronic-search-procedures-in-united-
states-v-comprehensive-drug-testing-rehearing (“Following . . . requests from Solicitor 
General Kagan and others on behalf of the Obama Administration, the Ninth Circuit 
conceded to revisit the opinion en banc, but denied the super en banc request.”). 
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decision.91  In response to pressures by law enforcement officials—not to 
mention the Obama administration and then-Solicitor General Elena 
Kagan—the Ninth Circuit’s revised opinion employs much of the same 
language as the original en banc decision, but relaxes the mandatory 
procedures for issuance of a warrant by omitting the language exacting 
mandatory requirements on government officials.92  Chief Judge 
Kozinski—the author of the original en banc majority opinion—issued a 
concurring opinion joined by four other judges, which recited precisely 
the same limitations on government as the original en banc decision, and 
continued to urge magistrate judges to require the government to 
“forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine.”93  The immediate effect of 
                                                 
91 See Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (ordering the revision of the original en banc decision and denoting that the new 
en banc decision shall “constitute the final action of the court”).  Notably, the new decision 
by the Ninth Circuit is no longer attributed to Chief Judge Kozinski, who instead filed a 
concurring opinion.  See id. (revising and superseding the original en banc decision penned 
by Chief Judge Kozinski); Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 993 (constituting the 
original en banc disposition authored by Chief Judge Kozinski). 
92  See Durkee, supra note 90 (“Federal prosecutors and the Obama administration 
contested that these procedural requirements were too stringent. . . . [T]hen-Solicitor 
General Elena Kagan argued that the Ninth Circuit’s strict guidelines produced a 
‘chill[ing]’ effect on the ability of prosecutors to obtain new search warrants for computers 
and other electronic data and records.” (second alteration in original)).  Compare 
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1006 (recounting the protocol government 
should follow in seeking warrants), with Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1177 
(employing precisely the same language as the original en banc majority opinion by 
Kozinski, C.J., but omitting the controversial recitation of limitations on the government in 
the “Concluding Thoughts” section of the opinion). 
93 Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 998.  Compare id. at 1006 (enunciating five 
limitations on government in the context of searches and seizures of electronically stored 
information), with Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1179 (Kozinski, C.J., 
concurring, joined by Kleinfeld, Fletcher, Paez, and Smith, JJ.) (enunciating the same five 
limitations on government and reiterating that “[i]f the government believes it’s entitled to 
retain data as to which no probable cause was shown in the original warrant, it may seek a 
new warrant or justify the warrantless seizure by some means other than plain view”).  
Chief Judge Kozinski also reaffirmed his belief that 
 [w]hen the government wishes to obtain a warrant to examine a 
computer hard drive or electronic storage medium . . . or when a 
search for evidence could result in the seizure of a computer, 
magistrate judges should insist that the government forswear reliance 
on the plain view doctrine[, and] should also require the government 
to forswear reliance on any similar doctrine that would allow retention 
of data obtained only because the government was required to 
segregate seizable from non-seizable data.  This will ensure that future 
searches of electronic records do not “make a mockery of Tamura”—
indeed, the Fourth Amendment—by turning all warrants for digital 
data into general warrants.  If the government doesn’t consent to such 
a waiver, the magistrate judge should [require separation] by an 
independent third party . . . or deny the warrant altogether. 
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the Ninth Circuit’s revision is that the five limitations announced by the 
court in the original en banc decision are no longer binding authority, 
but now merely provide guidance to magistrates in attempting to 
balance the Fourth Amendment’s mandates with law enforcement’s 
needs in effective and efficient operation.94  Although the Ninth Circuit 
amended its position as to the plain view doctrine’s application to digital 
searches and seizures to permit the government more latitude, the 
volatile disposition of the case, and the circuit’s inability to issue a 
decision with which it was satisfied, serve to highlight the daunting 
tasks that face magistrates and appeals courts alike in attempting to 
fashion constitutional rules that adequately serve each of the competing 
interests.95 
3. The Tenth Circuit’s Indirect “Special Approach” 
In United States v. Carey, the Tenth Circuit addressed the similar issue 
of whether a police search was constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment and created a “special approach” to digital evidence cases.96  
In Carey, a law enforcement official searching a computer pursuant to a 
warrant for evidence relating to narcotics came across images of child 
pornography.97  He subsequently abandoned the search for the narcotics 
evidence named in the warrant and began to look for additional images 
of child pornography.98  The Tenth Circuit concluded that the search for 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 1178 (citation omitted). 
94 See Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1183 (Callahan, J, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“I initially express my concerns with the proposed guidelines for 
searches of electronically stored data that are set forth in the Chief Judge’s concurring 
opinion.  The concurrence is not joined by a majority of the en banc panel and accordingly 
the suggested guidelines are not Ninth Circuit law.”); Durkee, supra note 90 (“In practical 
effect, this revised en banc opinion no longer makes Kozinski’s five-part procedural 
requirements binding for magistrate courts.  Instead, magistrate[s] are required only to use 
these five procedural safeguards as ‘a useful tool for the future.’” (quoting Comprehensive 
Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1180 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring))). 
95 See Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1177 (majority opinion) (“[The reality 
that over-seizing is inherent within the digital search context] calls for greater vigilance on 
the part of judicial officers in striking the right balance between the government’s interest 
in law enforcement and the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”).  The new decision ultimately recognized that “[e]veryone’s interests are best 
served if there are clear rules to follow that strike a fair balance between the legitimate 
needs of law enforcement and the right of individuals and enterprises to the privacy that is 
at the heart of the Fourth Amendment,” and “updated Tamura to apply to the daunting 
realities of electronic searches.”  Id. 
96 172 F.3d 1268, 1271, 1275 n.7 (10th Cir. 1999). 
97 Id. at 1271. 
98 Id.  The defendant had been under investigation for possible sale and possession of 
cocaine, and the police obtained a warrant for his arrest.  Id.  While at his residence, 
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additional images was improper and employed a “special approach” in 
an attempt to avoid allowing discovery of evidence outside the scope of 
the warrant in computer searches.99 
The defendant argued that the search of the computers transformed 
the warrant into a “general warrant” and resulted in a general—and 
therefore illegal—search of the computers and their files.100  The 
government alleged that the plain view doctrine authorized the police 
seizure of the files and that the defendant’s written consent allowed their 
                                                                                                             
however, the police noticed in plain view a bong and what appeared to be marijuana; 
surprised, the police asked for consent to search the rest of the apartment, and after much 
discussion, Carey obliged and signed a formal written consent.  Id.  With such consent, the 
officers returned to the apartment later that night and discovered cocaine, marijuana, and 
hallucinogenic mushrooms.  Id.  The officers also seized two computers that they believed 
might evidence drug dealing, which they took back to the police station and obtained a 
warrant to search.  Id. at 1272.  The warrant allowed the police to search for “names, 
telephone numbers, ledgers, receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence 
pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled substances.”  Id. at 1272–73.  The police 
copied the hard drives and began searching through the files by entering key words into 
the computer’s search mechanism to find “text-based” files containing such words; this 
search, however, produced no files “related to drugs.”  Id. at 1271.  The key words were 
terms such as “money, accounts, people, so forth.”  Id.  The officers continued their search 
by sifting through the directories until they encountered some files they “[were] not 
familiar with,” which were non-text, JPG files.  Id.  An officer opened the first file and it 
contained child pornography.  Id.  The police copied the rest of the JPG files to disks and 
searched through approximately one hundred more in attempting to locate additional 
evidence of child pornography.  Id.  When being questioned by the government, the officer 
searching the computer files stated that until he opened each file, he really did not know its 
contents.  Id.  However, he acknowledged that he downloaded and viewed these files 
knowing each of them contained pictures.  Id.  Still, he claimed that “I wasn’t conducting a 
search for child pornography, [but] that happened to be what these turned out to be.”  Id.  
From the tone of the opinion, the court seemed hesitant to believe his testimony.  See id. 
99 Id. at 1275 n.7, 1277.  The court advised:  “Where officers come across relevant 
documents so intermingled with irrelevant documents that they cannot feasibly be sorted 
at the site, the officers may seal or hold the documents pending approval by a magistrate of 
the conditions and limitations on a further search through the documents.”  Id. at 1275.  
This special approach has gained much headway in the judiciary, but also has many 
skeptics.  See RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to Digital 
Evidence, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31, 49 (2007) (suggesting that much of the 
problem with the Tenth Circuit’s approach in Carey was the unwillingness of the court to 
directly apply the plain view doctrine to digital evidence); infra Part III.B (discussing the 
pros and cons of applying a special approach to the application of the plain view doctrine 
to computer-related evidence). 
100 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1271–72.  The defendant in Carey argued that, when examined 
against the history and case law of the Fourth Amendment, the search constituted general 
rummaging in “flagrant disregard” for the terms of the warrant and in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, and that despite the specificity of the search warrant, files not 
pertaining to the sale or distribution of controlled substances were opened and searched, 
and such files should have been suppressed.  Id. at 1272. 
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search.101  The Tenth Circuit found the government’s plain view 
argument unavailing because the investigator had to open the files to 
view them before he knew whether they contained drug-related 
activity.102  The court reasoned that because the warrant permitted only 
the search of the computer files for “names, telephone numbers, ledgers, 
receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the 
sale and distribution of controlled substances,” the scope of the search 
was limited to evidence relevant to drug trafficking.103  The court noted 
that when the investigator discovered the first pornographic image he 
abandoned his search for drugs and began searching for similar 
pornographic materials and thus was searching outside the parameters 
of the warrant.104  The court resolved the case on other grounds, 
                                                 
101 Id.  According to the government’s line of argument, “a computer search such as the 
one undertaken in this case is tantamount to looking for documents in a file cabinet, 
pursuant to a valid search warrant, and instead finding child pornography.”  Id.  The 
government’s reasoning continued that “[j]ust as if officers ha[d] seized pornographic 
photographs from a file cabinet, seizure of the pornographic computer images was 
permissible because officers had a valid warrant, the pornographic images were in plain 
view, and the incriminating nature was readily apparent.”  Id.  The warrant, therefore, 
“authorized the officer to search any file because ‘any file might well have contained 
information relating to drug crimes and the fact that some files might have appeared to 
have been graphics files would not necessarily preclude them from containing such 
information.’”  Id.  Finally, the government argued that the defendant’s consent to search 
the apartment overrode all of these questions because it extended to the search of every file 
on both computers.  Id. 
102 Id. at 1273.  The court aptly stated that “it is the contents of the files and not the files 
themselves which were seized,” and noted that the investigator “could not at first 
distinguish between the text files and the JPG files upon which he did an unsuccessful 
word search.  Indeed, he had to open the first JPG file and examine its contents to 
determine what the file contained.”  Id.  Thus, the court analogized the files on the 
computer with separate compartments in a coat or suitcase; each must be opened 
individually and the contents examined before the police will know what each contains.  Id. 
at 1277. 
103 Id. at 1272–73.  The Tenth Circuit ultimately looked to the subjective intent of the 
officer conducting the search and seizure.  See id. at 1273 (noting that the officer 
“abandoned [his original] search” by looking at the subsequent files, and, thus, because the 
officer “expected to find child pornography and not material related to drugs,” the court 
was unable to say “the contents of each of [the subsequent] files were inadvertently 
discovered”).  Interestingly, the Supreme Court has explicitly concluded that whether 
evidence is discovered inadvertently is completely irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment 
analysis in regards to the plain view doctrine—at least insofar as physical evidence is 
concerned.  See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138–40 (1990) (concluding that the 
“inadvertence requirement” of the plain view doctrine should no longer be analyzed as 
part of the application of the doctrine). 
104 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1277 (Baldock, J., concurring).  After viewing the contents of the first 
file, the investigator, according to his own testimony, stated that he then had “probable 
cause” to believe the remaining JPG files contained similar erotic material.  Id. at 1276.  
Thus, through the investigator’s own admission, it was clear that each time he opened a 
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ultimately concluding that all but the first pornographic image were 
outside the scope of the warrant, but noted in dicta that the 
pornographic images were in closed files and thus not in plain view.105  
The court also provided several means by which investigators could 
tailor their future conduct to meet the commands of the Fourth 
Amendment:  they could observe file types and titles listed on the 
directory, do a key word search for relevant terms, or read portions of 
each file stored in the memory.106 
One enduring aspect of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Carey is the 
court’s rejection of the government’s proposed “file cabinet” analogy, 
and its realization that computers are likely to contain large quantities of 
intermingled documents.107  The Tenth Circuit concluded that file cabinet 
                                                                                                             
subsequent JPG file he expected to find child pornography and not material related to 
drugs.  Id. 
105 Id. at 1273 (majority opinion).  The court noted that “[a]lthough the question of what 
constitutes ‘plain view’ in the context of computer files is intriguing and appears to be an 
issue of first impression for this court, and many others, we do not need to reach it here.”  
Id.  The Tenth Circuit ultimately determined that the fact the files were labeled as “JPG” 
and had sexually suggestive titles, the officer knew—especially after opening the first of the 
pornographic files—that he was not going to find drug related activity.  Id. at 1274. 
106 Id. at 1276. 
107 Id. at 1275.  Academics have likewise supported this notion.  See Susan W. Brenner & 
Barbara A. Frederiksen, Computer Searches and Seizures:  Some Unresolved Issues, 8 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 39, 60–63, 81–82 (2002), available at 
http://www.mttlr.org/voleight/Brenner.pdf (suggesting that computers and computer 
storage systems differ from paper documents, and therefore require different rules and 
approaches).  Many courts, however, have also analogized computers to other more 
familiar tangible objects such as datebooks, containers, briefcases, and other closed 
containers.  See, e.g., United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993).  In Chan, 
the court stated that “[t]he expectation of privacy in an electronic repository for personal 
data is therefore analogous to that in a personal address book or other repository for such 
information.”  Id.  Courts have also held that “an individual has the same expectation of 
privacy in a pager, computer or other electronic data storage and retrieval device as in a 
closed container.”  Id. at 535 (quoting United States v. Blas, No. 90-CR-162, 1990 WL 265179, 
at *21 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 4, 1990)); see also United States v. David, 756 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (D. 
Nev. 1991) (holding that a computer’s memory, due to its ability to store and hold large 
amounts of information, “is indistinguishable from any other closed container, and is 
entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protection” (citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 
420, 427 (1981))).  Although appellate courts have upheld some searches and seizures of 
computer memory devices, these courts have all relied on an individual’s lack of standing 
to challenge the search and have avoided indications that computer memory enjoys 
anything other than a very high level of protection.  E.g., United States v. Lyons, 992 F.2d 
1029, 1031–32 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 958–59 (6th Cir. 
1990).  Further, the Department of Justice relies, at least in part, on the closed container 
approach to digital searches and seizures.  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING 
AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS pt. I.B.2 (July 2002), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/ 
LPS36377 (“To determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information stored in a computer, it helps to treat the computer like a closed container such 
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and closed-container analogies to computers and computer files are 
insufficient because they oversimplify the realities of mass storage 
devices.108  The Fourth Amendment should provide protection in an area 
that was little contemplated during its proliferation.109 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Courts have certainly struggled in attempting to apply traditional 
rules and concepts of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the context of 
computer and digital evidence.  Part III of this Note discusses the 
positive and negative aspects of the various approaches courts have 
taken in an attempt to reconcile these novel difficulties with the Fourth 
Amendment’s constitutional protections.110  Part III.A specifically 
discusses the circumstances under which computer searches become 
overly broad and the avenues courts have employed to combat this 
phenomenon.111  Part III.B analyzes the “special approaches” that courts 
have taken in an attempt to reconcile Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
individual civil liberties, and the government’s interest in the proper 
administration of justice, and discusses both the helpful and problematic 
facets of the judicial attempts.112  Finally, Part III.C evaluates the ability 
of the container analogy to adequately safeguard constitutional rights, 
while remaining sympathetic to the efforts of law enforcement.113  
Ultimately, Part III concludes that existing approaches fail to properly 
                                                                                                             
as a briefcase or file cabinet,” and that the Constitution generally does not allow for the 
government “accessing and viewing information stored in a computer . . . if it would be 
prohibited from opening a closed container and examining its contents in the same 
situation”). 
108 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275.  Computer storage is likely to contain a greater quantity and 
variety of information than storage methods from the past and as a result “computers make 
tempting targets in searches for incriminating information.”  Id. (quoting Winick, supra note 
14, at 104).  “Relying on [such misplaced analogies] may lead courts to ‘oversimplify a 
complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modern 
computer storage.’”  Id. (quoting Winick, supra note 14, at 110). 
109 See infra Part III.B–C (discussing the positive and negative aspects of the different 
approaches courts have taken to attempt to abide by this concept). 
110 See infra Part III (analyzing the approaches courts have taken when applying the plain 
view doctrine in the context of digital evidence cases). 
111 See infra Part III.A (discussing the circumstances under which warrants may become 
general and the attempts by courts to reconcile what they discern to be a novel dilemma 
within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
112 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the “special approaches” that courts have taken to 
attempt to solve this problem, and the positive and negative aspects of this line of 
reasoning). 
113 See infra Part III.C (evaluating the feasibility of the closed-container analogies between 
computers and containers in the ambit of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and more 
specifically, in regard to the plain view doctrine). 
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balance the competing interests involved in computer evidence cases and 
discusses the shortcomings of the various approaches to the problem 
while leaving open possible solutions and avenues for remedy.114 
A. When Computer Searches Become General 
Why should it matter that the government is able to sift through all 
of the files on a given computer?  And should information stored on a 
computer system or general server be afforded more or less 
constitutional protection under the Fourth Amendment?  It is generally 
accepted that if, in the context of digital evidence, police are otherwise in 
a valid position to view the computer screen, the images on the screen 
will be deemed in “plain view.”115  However, courts and scholars dealing 
with the more complicated issue of data stored within a computer—or 
even data on an entire computer system—have created two independent 
lines of reasoning, each with its own advantages and disadvantages.116 
                                                 
114 See infra Part IV (proposing a solution to the problem of applying the plain view 
doctrine in the context of computer evidence cases). 
115 Compare People v. Blair, 748 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that police 
who observed “bookmarks with references to teenagers and so forth,” did not have 
probable cause to believe that computer contained child pornography), State v. Mays, 829 
N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding that observations of a computer screen 
during the search of a home qualified as in plain view), and State v. One Pioneer CD-ROM 
Changer, 891 P.2d 600, 604–05 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995) (during execution of search warrant 
based on allegations that suspect was distributing pornographic material, police 
observations of computer established that the equipment and its possible criminal use were 
in plain view), with United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
observation of nude women on computer screen by officer during search of apartment did 
not justify search of computer for other incriminating data), and State v. Brown, 813 N.E.2d 
956, 960–62 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the incriminating nature of computers and 
their contents is not immediately apparent based on mere observation of two computers in 
defendant’s house, where there was no pornography displayed on screen, and where 
police merely knew that pornographic material had been printed from a computer). 
116 See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 997–98, 999, 1000–01, 1003–04, 1006 
(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), revised and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (creating a special approach and establishing guidelines that should be “vigilant[ly]” 
adhered to by lower courts).  These guidelines are as follows: 
 1.  Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance 
upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases. 
 2.  Segregation and redaction [of computer data] must be either 
done by specialized personnel or an independent third party. . . . 
 3.  Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of 
destruction of information as well as prior efforts to seize that 
information in other judicial fora. 
 4.  The government’s search protocol must be designed to 
uncover only the information for which it has probable cause, and only 
that information may be examined by the case agents. 
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The first view suggests that digital evidence searches require a 
special approach—even going as far as to forswear use of the plain view 
doctrine entirely and provide judicially imposed guidelines for executing 
a search.117  This approach is impractical as applied, stifles the 
administration of justice, and finds little if any foundation in 
                                                                                                             
 5.  The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully 
possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate 
informed about when it has done so and what it has kept. 
Id. at 1006. Compare id. (urging magistrates to require the government to forswear reliance 
on either the plain view doctrine or any other similar doctrine), with United States v. 
Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the government’s discovery of 
child pornography was inadvertent during a search for fake ID’s and therefore valid 
pursuant to the plain view exception), and United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (suggesting that the correct inquiry asks whether the official “abandoned” his 
original search and therefore unconstitutionally expanded the scope of the warrant—
turning the initially limited and constitutional search into a general, exploratory, and 
unconstitutional search). 
117 See, e.g., Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272–75 (holding that continuing to open files in a search 
for child pornography after the first file had already been opened and observed, during the 
execution of a search warrant for documentary evidence relating to drugs, could not be 
justified by the plain view doctrine because the files were “closed” and unambiguously 
labeled).  The Tenth Circuit in Carey further suggested that the search of the computer was 
limited by judicial discretion including, for example, searches by file name or file type.  Id. 
at 1273.  Interestingly, however, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits—as well as a number of 
other courts—have explicitly found that search protocols are not necessary because the 
object of the search serves to narrow the search itself.  United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966 
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2005).  That is to say, if 
agents are issued a warrant to search for files related to child pornography, the fact they are 
authorized to look only for child pornography is enough to keep the search within the 
scope of the warrant.  See Hill, 459 F.3d at 970–71 (suggesting that the object of the search 
can serve to narrow the scope of the search); Brooks, 427 F.3d at 1253–55 (suggesting the 
same).  Suppose, however, that the government has probable cause to believe an individual 
is going to launch a terrorist attack on a given landmark or well-known area.  Under a 
special approach, the government might be prohibited from immediately reviewing the 
entire contents of a computer to ascertain whether other terrorist schemes were being 
plotted against other areas in the United States.  See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 
at 998 (imposing strict judicial guidelines that forswear the plain-view doctrine or any 
similar doctrine in computer evidence cases); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1268 (imposing a special 
approach that inquires as to the subjective intent of the officer to be used in computer 
evidence cases).  But see Giberson, 527 F.3d at 887–88 (declining to impose heightened 
Fourth Amendment protections in computer search cases unless they are “based on a 
principle that is not technology-specific”).  To see how this Note’s proposed solution would 
handle such a dilemma, see infra Part IV.B.1 (suggesting that if the government knew of the 
additional threats prior to executing the warrant and failed to particularize them therein—
either negligently or because it was unsure as to whether probable cause existed—the 
seizure would be unconstitutional; otherwise, the government would be allowed to 
conduct their search within the scope of the warrant and seize any information regarding 
the additional plots). 
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precedent.118  This view not only generates substantial costs to society 
and underestimates the guile of modern criminals in their ability to 
conceal digital information with rapidly increasing ease, but disregards 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Horton v. California, which completely 
dispelled the inadvertence requirement to plain view seizures.119 
The second view equates computers with closed containers, such as 
lockers, briefcases, and luggage, and the data stored therein as contents 
of the container.120  This view, to some extent, underestimates the 
differences between digital evidence and physical evidence and grants 
great latitude to the government in executing search warrants.121  
Nonetheless, it finds foundation in Fourth Amendment precedent and 
provides for adequate enforcement of the law.122  Ultimately, these two 
views conflict as to the importance of the expectations of privacy in 
computer data, the feasibility of employing judicially crafted mandates 
for executions of search warrants, and the application of the Fourth 
                                                 
118 See Chang, supra note 99, at 49 (finding that the Tenth Circuit’s special approach 
“overlooked” clear instruction from the Supreme Court); Ziff, supra note 60, at 853 
(suggesting that the Tenth Circuit’s special approach “incorrectly relies on the subjective 
intent of the searching officer to determine the constitutional limits on the scope of a 
computer search”); see also infra Part III.B (discussing the positive and negative aspects of 
the “special approaches” to computer evidence). 
119 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138–40 (1990) (rejecting inadvertent discovery 
as necessary for the plain view exception but recognizing that the possibility of officers 
using plain view to execute pretextual searches is a legitimate Fourth Amendment 
concern); see also United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–91 (C.D. Cal. 2004) 
(rejecting defendant’s argument that the search warrant was overbroad for failing to 
articulate a strategy for searching his computer and articulating that such a strategy was 
impracticable because defendant could have easily hidden the contraband under 
misleading file names). 
120 See, e.g., supra note 88 (providing examples of courts that have required the 
government to identify the specific data on a computer that is sought under the warrant). 
121 See Comprehensive Drug Testing I, 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that analogies 
between closed containers and computers are tenuous and allows excessive government 
latitude in conducting searches and seizures), vacated as moot, 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008), 
vacated and granted rehearing en banc, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Carey, 172 F.3d at 
1273–74 (confronting a search through defendant’s computer for drug-related evidence that 
ultimately yielded child pornography); United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 86 (1st Cir. 
1999) (confronting a search through a computer for assault-based evidence that ultimately 
yielded child pornography); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 526–27 (E.D. Va. 
1999) (confronting a search through a computer for hacking-related evidence that 
ultimately yielded child pornography). 
122 As one court has noted, the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
“serves three related purposes:  preventing general searches, preventing the seizure of 
objects upon the mistaken assumption that they fall within the magistrate’s authorization, 
and preventing the issuance of warrants without a substantial factual basis.”  United States 
v. Vilar, No. S308CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting United 
States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 758–59 (2d Cir. 1984)). 
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Amendment’s particularity requirement.123  The proper approach 
balances the government’s interest in the administration of justice and 
the individual’s interest in remaining free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures while adhering to the Supreme Court’s precedential values 
in the realm of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.124 
B. The Especially Impractical “Special Approach” 
As evidenced, there is relatively little case law regarding precisely 
how the plain view exception to the warrant requirement should apply 
in computer evidence cases; some scholars suggest that courts should 
apply the Fourth Amendment’s protections zealously and absolutely.125  
Computers, as storehouses of personal information, should enjoy a 
strong amount of protection under the Fourth Amendment; thus, the 
plethora of information and ever-increasing storage capacities of home 
computers justifies the highest expectation of privacy.126  Recently, a 
federal district court in New York explicitly embraced the file cabinet 
analogy as opposed to the closed-container analogy.127  The court in In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum quashed a grand jury subpoena for a 
                                                 
123 Compare Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(Callahan and Ikuta, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing “several 
concerns regarding the breadth of the majority’s new guidelines that purport to govern 
future digital evidence cases”), revised and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc), United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
government search was valid because it did not proceed with its search until after an 
additional warrant had been obtained), and Comprehensive Drug Testing I, 473 F.3d at 935 
(“We reject the dissent’s view that government officials should limit their computer 
searches to key words suggested by a searched party.”), with Comprehensive Drug Testing I, 
473 F.3d at 964–65 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that “[t]he 
more sensible theory with respect to electronic data is to . . . require that a neutral 
magistrate examine the co-mingled data . . . to make sure that private information that the 
government is not authorized to see remains private.  Agents who expect to encounter 
intermingled data or who unexpectedly encounter it may not review the data unabated, 
but must seek a magistrate’s guidance on how to proceed”), and United States v. Hill, 459 
F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that not allowing the police to seize the intermingled 
data for further processing would “not only impose a significant and unjustified burden on 
police resources, it would also make the search more intrusive”). 
124 See infra Part IV (proposing a solution to the problem of applying the plain view 
doctrine in the context of digital and computer evidence cases). 
125 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 65, at 280 (arguing that new dynamics of computer crime 
should result in the creation of new doctrines that “impose some new restrictions on police 
conduct”). 
126 See Winick, supra note 14 (suggesting that because computers store such a massive 
amount of information of various forms they are inherently entitled to heightened 
protection under the Fourth Amendment). 
127 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 15, 1993, 846 F. Supp. 11, 12–13 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying Second Circuit case law regarding files and filing cabinets to 
computers and electronic documents). 
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company’s hard disk drive because of the innate risk of exposing highly 
personal information.128  Thus, it comes as no surprise that seizures of 
computers and digital data have inherently high potential for 
overreaching and intrusion.129 
Accordingly, proponents of the special approach suggest that 
analogizing computers to closed containers—thus allowing extremely 
broad searches—relies on a “simplistic and inappropriate” 
characterization of computers.130  This view suggests the fundamental 
differences between digitally stored data and physical data require a 
different analysis under the Fourth Amendment, and suggest that 
applying the plain view doctrine goes too far.131  For instance, computer 
searches are different from physical document searches because 
computer forensics tools allow for more narrowly tailored searches than 
are possible with paper documentation.132  However, in a reality that 
                                                 
128 Id. at 13.  The court further noted that although the disks might contain incriminating 
information, they also contained highly personal files, such as a draft of a will and personal 
financial information.  Id. 
129 See supra note 87 (explaining that a search of digital data raises an inherent danger that 
the search may involve third-party data as well). 
130 See Winick, supra note 14, at 110 (“An analogy between a computer and a container 
oversimplifies a complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrine and ignores the realities of 
massive modern computer storage.”); see also Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 107, at 81–
82 (setting forth some of the differences between searches of “paper documents and 
computer-generated evidence” and maintaining that courts should impose restrictions on 
computer searches such as limiting the search by file types by requiring a second warrant 
for intermingled files and imposing time frames for conducting the search).  However, the 
Supreme Court has heard this argument and considered it unpersuasive in the past.  See 
generally Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139–40 (1990) (arguing that the interest in 
“prevent[ing] the police from conducting general searches, or from converting specific 
warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive because that interest is already served by 
the requirements that no warrant issue unless it ‘particularly describ[es] the place to be 
searched and the persons or things to be seized,’” and “[s]crupulous adherence to these 
requirements serves the interests in limiting the area and duration of the search” (quoting 
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987))). 
131 See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 n.7 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We have stated 
our belief that the storage capacity of computers requires a special approach, and we do 
not intend to comment on the particularity requirement as it applies to all contemporary 
media.”); see also People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 160 (Colo. 2001) (Martinez, J., dissenting) 
(“Because computers process personal information and effects, they require heightened 
protection under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches or seizures.” 
(citing Winick, supra note 14, at 80–83)). 
132 See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, Chicago, Illinois 60621, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 959 
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (recognizing that “while computers present the possibility of confronting far 
greater volumes of documents than are typically presented in a paper document search, 
computers also present the tools to refine searches in ways that cannot be done with hard 
copy files”).  However, this line of reasoning fails to account for the ingenuity of the 
modern criminal, and the ease with which inculpating information may be hidden, altered, 
or destroyed.  See United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582 (D. Vt. 1998) (noting that 
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recognizes the rapidly evolving criminal mind, many of these search 
processes provide a grossly inadequate means for searching for altered 
or encrypted file names or extensions.133  Because there is often no way 
to know what is in a file without examining its contents, attempting to 
provide judicial direction to searches and seizures of computer data, 
especially prior to the search or seizure, subjects magistrates to the 
impracticable task of outlining methods or means by which law 
enforcement officials may conduct a search.134 
This special approach further calls for a significantly circumscribed 
ability for law enforcement officials to search throughout an entire 
computer and disguises this exacting cost on the administration of justice 
as necessary to ensure citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.135  Thus, 
when an officer comes across evidence of a crime unrelated to the given 
warrant, this view requires officers to completely halt the search and 
petition a neutral magistrate for a second warrant.136  Although images 
                                                                                                             
it may be difficult for government to determine what to seize without doing some level of 
review of everything in the cabinet, as “few people keep documents of their criminal 
transactions in a folder marked ‘[crime] records’” (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir.1990))). 
133 Clancy, supra note 66, at 208–09 (commenting that a court suggesting the government 
may not seize or look through a file based on its label is analogous to saying the 
government may not seize a plastic bag containing a white powder because it is labeled 
“flour” or “talcum powder” (quoting United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 108, 1090–91 
(C.D. Cal. 2004))); see United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining 
that “in the age of modern technology and commercial availability of various forms of 
items, [a] warrant [cannot] be expected to describe with exactitude the precise form the 
records [might] take” because records of criminal activity—in this case, drugs—might well 
be found in cassettes, leases, and accounts cards, or in cancelled checks); see also Carey, 172 
F.3d at 1275 (stating that in cases involving images stored in a computer, the file cabinet 
analogy may be inadequate because digital and electronic storage is likely to contain a 
greater variety of information than any previous storage methods). 
134 See United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Especially when 
the user wants to conceal criminal evidence, he often stores it in random order with 
deceptive file names.  This requires searching authorities to examine all the stored data to 
determine whether it is included in the warrant.”); see also Erickson v. Comm’r, 937 F.2d 
1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that drug trafficking activity is often concealed or 
masked by deceptive records or files); United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–91 
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (“There is no way to know what is in a [computer] file without examining 
its contents, just as there is no sure way of separating talcum from cocaine except by testing 
it.”); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[H]ackers often 
intentionally mislabel files, or attempt to bury incriminating files within innocuously 
named directories.”); Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (“Computer records are extremely 
susceptible to tampering, hiding, or destruction, whether deliberate or inadvertent.”). 
135 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the proper balance between the interests of the 
government and the individual’s Fourth Amendment protections). 
136 United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 987 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that by immediately 
going to a magistrate to obtain a second warrant after discovering the initial image of child 
pornography, the officer ensured that his search was “reasonable and within the 
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that are displayed on a computer screen are clearly recognized as within 
plain view, this approach would not extend the plain view doctrine to 
closed computer files on a hard drive that are subsequently opened.137  
Nor would this view allow for the seizure of information stored on a 
network or general server because it would require specified search 
procedures for sifting through the massive amounts of information, even 
though the procedures may well fall short in allowing for the discovery 
of all evidence pertaining to the warrant.138  This view implicitly suggests 
that law enforcement officials routinely operate in bad faith and 
presumes that proactive stipulations are necessary to curb overly zealous 
law enforcement officials.139  Ultimately, the special approach is 
problematic because it severely curtails the ability of officers to conduct 
general warrants but allows for officers to obtain a second warrant to 
search the rest of the computer’s files regardless.140 
                                                                                                             
parameters of the [original] search warrant”).  This reasoning, however, runs counter to 
explicitly articulated Supreme Court principles.  See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 
(1987) (noting “the desirability of sparing police, whose viewing of the object in the course 
of a lawful search is as legitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconvenience 
and the risk—to themselves or to preservation of the evidence—of going to obtain a 
warrant” when evidence is discovered in plain view).  The mere technicality of forcing 
police to obtain a second warrant does little, if anything, to protect the Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights of individuals, and creates an undue and unnecessary burden on the part of 
law enforcement officials.  See id. at 328. 
137 See Walser, 275 F.3d at 987 (noting that the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights 
were not violated because the police obtained a second warrant before continuing the 
search for child pornography files); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275 (employing a subjective intent-
based “special approach” that ultimately asks whether the officer searching the computer 
expected to find the incriminating digital evidence). 
138 See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (noting that investigators cannot rely on file suffixes to 
limit searches for computer files because they do not know if the computer’s owner 
attempted to hide his files by changing the file suffixes—which is both easy and common). 
139 See United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690, at *6 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 
2009) (“The CDT protocols impose extraordinary precautions against police misconduct for 
all applications for a warrant to search a computer, assuming misconduct will be the rule, 
not the exception.”); see also United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 950 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 
23, 2009) (finding that “the Government’s attempts to claim that they discovered the files 
while looking for evidence of Computer Intrusion is a clear attempt to justify the 
government’s warrantless search for evidence of child pornography and to manipulate the 
Court into authorizing their defiance of the Magistrate’s order”). 
140 See Walser, 275 F.3d at 987 (holding that because the officer obtained the second 
warrant to search for files relating to child pornography, he ensured that the “search was 
reasonable and within the parameters of the [original] search warrant”); Carey, 172 F.3d at 
1276 (holding that officers should obtain a second warrant in order to continue searching 
the computer for files relating to child pornography).  It further contradicts Supreme Court 
precedent by restricting the ability of law enforcement to adequately conduct their duties.  
See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979) (“[I]t is generally left to the discretion of 
the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance 
of a search authorized by warrant.”). 
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While implicitly adhering to this special approach, the Ninth Circuit 
in Comprehensive Drug Testing took the judicially unprecedented step of 
suggesting that the government “forswear reliance” on the plain view 
doctrine or any similar doctrine that would allow the government to retain 
data it obtained only because it was unable to properly segregate the 
intermingled evidence.141  The court reasoned that because the 
government will ultimately determine the extent of the seizure, which is 
itself a potentially inaccurate assessment, it will create a powerful 
incentive to “seize more rather than less.”142  The court further imposed 
requirements that in future computer evidence cases the government 
must fairly disclose the actual risk of concealment or destruction of 
evidence as opposed to merely the theoretical risk.143  Additionally, in 
what will likely extract significant administrative costs, the court 
mandated that only specialized computer personnel should sort and 
separate the seizable and nonseizable data, as denoted in the search 
warrant.144 
Demonstrably, courts taking a special approach to the searches and 
seizures of computer evidence and digital information are unlikely to 
uphold more general searches of computers or find that the computer’s 
                                                 
141 Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 998, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (suggesting 
that in the context of computer evidence cases, “the government should, in future warrant 
applications, forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine or any similar doctrine”), revised 
and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).  But see Farlow, 2009 WL 
4728690, at 6 (finding that to require the Government to forswear reliance on the plain view 
doctrine is “an extreme remedy better reserved for the unusual, not common case,” and 
that such a directive “placed in a different context, is equivalent to demanding that a DEA 
investigative team engaged in the search of a residence for drugs promise to ignore 
screams from a closet or a victim tied to a chair”). 
142 Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 998. 
143 Id.  This requirement imposed by the Ninth Circuit is perhaps more properly seen as 
its attempt to foreclose what it inferred was bad faith on behalf of the government.  See id.  
However, in the very same paragraph, the majority opinion recognizes that this bad faith 
will be adequately dealt with when determining whether to exclude the evidence vis-à-vis a 
motion to dismiss.  See id. at 999 (“A lack of candor in this or any other aspect of the 
warrant application shall bear heavily against the government in the calculus of any 
subsequent motion to return or suppress the seized data.”). 
144 Compare id. 1000–01, 1006 (finding that “[s]egregation and redaction must be either 
done by specialized personnel or an independent third party”), with id. at 1013 (Callahan & 
Ikuta, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the majority opinion 
“offers no support for its protocol requiring the segregation of computer data by 
specialized personnel or an independent third party,” and that “this new ex ante 
restriction . . . raises practical, cost-related concerns”).  Of significant importance to the 
concurring judges was the majority’s “newly minted search protocol[]” that mandates 
warrants make clear that “only persons not involved in the investigation may examine and 
segregate the data.”  Id. at 1011 n.6. 
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files are subject to the plain view doctrine.145  Attempting to guard 
against overbroad warrants that jeopardize the Fourth Amendment 
rights of innocent Americans as well as criminals, this special approach 
suggests that applying the plain view doctrine to computer searches 
gives the government “free rein” to rummage through computers.146  
Proponents further suggest that applying this specialized, more 
circumscribed approach is easily reconciled with the Supreme Court’s 
precedent in Hicks; however, this fails to recognize that unlike the 
physical property confronted in Hicks, digital property and computer 
evidence create novel opportunities for criminals to disguise or conceal 
evidence of incriminating character.147  Ultimately, it appears as though 
the special approach to computer searches is taking the forefront in the 
minds of scholars and is beginning to see increased popularity in the 
judiciary as well.148 
                                                 
145 See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273 (finding that because the officers expected to find the 
subsequent images of child pornography—and therefore did not “inadvertently discover[]” 
the images—the images could not rightly be considered within plain view).  In Carey, the 
defendant argued that the officer’s “search of the computers transformed the warrant into a 
‘general warrant’ and resulted in a general and illegal search of the computers and their 
files.”  Id. at 1271–72; see also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 422 (C.A.A.F. 1996) 
(finding that where a colonel used a personal computer to transport child pornography, the 
plain view doctrine did not apply to the search of computer files because the warrant did 
not authorize the search of those files and view was obtained as a result of improper 
governmental opening, not as a result of seeing what was legitimately in plain view). 
146 See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 998 (“If the government can’t be sure 
whether data may be concealed, compressed, erased or booby-trapped without carefully 
examining the contents of every file—and we have no cavil with this general proposition—
then everything the government chooses to seize will, under this theory, automatically 
come into plain view.”); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1271–72 (finding that if the government were 
allowed to use the plain view doctrine it could transform all searches of computers into 
“general warrant[s]”). 
147 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1984) (holding that an officer who moved stereo 
equipment to see the serial numbers underneath, and who, after subsequently phoning the 
numbers into headquarters and determining the equipment was stolen, seized the 
evidence, did not validly do so pursuant to the plain view doctrine).  This, however, does 
not illustrate that the Supreme Court is against invoking the plain view doctrine or even 
that they are for a more circumscribed reading of it; rather, it merely illustrates that 
evidence seized pursuant to plain view must be immediately apparent, and that any search 
beyond what is immediately apparent renders the determination of the criminality of the 
evidence not immediate.  See id. at 324–25. 
148 See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1006 (adopting a special approach to the 
plain view exception in computer evidence cases, attempting to “update” existing Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence to accord computer technology, and ultimately banning 
government use of the plain view doctrine or any similar doctrine in the context of computer 
evidence cases); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1268 (explicitly adopting a special approach to computer 
evidence cases that relies heavily on the subjective intent or mindset of the investigating 
officials); Winick, supra note 14, at 81 (discussing his version of the “special approach” to 
computer evidence cases). 
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C. The Attenuated Closed-Container Analogy 
“Container” is a well-defined and highly evolved term within Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.149  Many courts compare digitally stored 
data as a form of document and therefore authorize the search of 
computer files even if the warrant only specifies that writings or records 
may be searched.150  This line of reasoning is sympathetic to the varying 
needs of law enforcement officials and suggests the government need 
not know the exact “form that records may take.”151  Critics regard this 
view as overly simplistic because it asserts that there is no distinction 
between electronic records and physical records.152  However, this view 
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent in Andresen v. Maryland 
that “some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in 
order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers 
authorized to be seized.”153  Therefore, under the theory that data is a 
form of document and the computer is a container holding the 
                                                 
149 See generally CLANCY, supra note 23, at 40–42 (providing a background as to how 
containers are treated under the Fourth Amendment); TASLITZ, supra note 21, at pt. 1 
(providing the same). 
150 See also United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581 (D. Vt. 1998) (holding that 
warrant authorizing search for “records” permitted search of “computers, disks, and 
similar property”); Frasier v. State, 794 N.E.2d 449, 454, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding 
that warrant which authorized search of notes and records of marijuana sales also 
permitted the police to examine computer files). 
151 United States v. Gawryisak, 972 F. Supp. 853, 861 (D.N.J. 1997), aff’d, 178 F.3d 1281 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
152 United States v. Lievertz, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1063 (S.D. Ind. 2002).  The court in 
Lievertz suggested that there is “no principled distinction between those records kept 
electronically and those in paper form.”  Id.  However, some courts have suggested that 
this view is sensitive to individuals because there is “no justification for favoring those who 
are capable of storing their records on computer over those who keep hard copies of their 
records.”  Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 584. 
153 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976); see Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 582, 584 (recognizing the 
reality that few people store their incriminating records in clearly labeled boxes or 
containers); see also United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that few 
people label their belongings that are incriminating with obvious labels); United States v. 
Gray 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528 (E.D. Va. 1999) (suggesting few people label their 
incriminating evidence in obvious ways).  The Supreme Court in Andresen observed the 
following: 
We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a 
warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person’s papers that are 
not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for physical 
objects whose relevance is more easily ascertainable.  In searches for 
papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, 
at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, 
among those papers authorized to be seized. 
Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11. 
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document, traditional rules of document searches should apply and 
govern conduct.154 
Courts—and to a lesser extent scholars—adhering to the container 
approach to computer evidence have reasoned that there is no need to 
impute novel approaches into the law each time a novel difficulty 
arises.155  Instead, courts have looked to whether the warrant was 
sufficiently particular to describe the “place[s] to be searched” or the 
“persons or things to be seized.”156  These courts give deference to the 
                                                 
154 See, e.g., United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (explicitly 
comparing a computer to a closed container and suggesting the application of the law is 
analogous).  In Barth, the defendant took his computer to a repair shop and pornographic 
images of children were subsequently discovered; the computer was searched by police 
without a warrant.  Id. at 930.  The court found that the defendant did not lose a reasonable 
expectation to privacy by delivering the hard drive to a computer technician for repairs, so 
that a warrantless police search of the hard drive violated the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
 More important, however, is the court’s reasoning.  The court noted that although the 
protection afforded to a person’s computer files and hard drive was not well-defined, it 
concluded that the Fourth Amendment protection of closed computer files and hard drives 
was similar to the protection afforded a person’s closed containers and closed personal 
effects.  Id. at 932.  According to the court, outside of automobile searches, a warrant was 
usually required to search the contents of a closed container because the owner’s 
expectation of privacy related to the contents of that container rather than to the container 
itself.  Id.  By placing data in files in a storage device such as his hard drive, the court 
reasoned, the defendant manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of 
those files.  Id.  Further holding that the defendant did not lose his reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his closed, individual files when he gave the hard drive to the technician, the 
court stressed that the defendant gave the hard drive to the technician for the limited 
purpose of repairing a problem unrelated to specific files and also expected that he would 
have the unit back the following morning to continue his business.  Id. 
155 See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(Callahan and Ikuta, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Rather than adopting 
[a special] efficient but overbroad approach, the prudent course would be to allow the 
contours of the plain view doctrine to develop incrementally through the normal course of 
fact-based case adjudication.”), revised and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc). 
156 See U.S. CONST. Amend. IV; supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2 (discussing how courts have used 
the warrant requirement and the particularity requirement, respectively, to attempt to 
reconcile novel difficulties that computers create within the context of the Fourth 
Amendment).  The nature of the crime, for example, might require a broad police search.  
See, e.g., Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480–81 n.10 (“Like a jigsaw puzzle, the whole ‘picture’ of 
petitioner’s false-pretense scheme . . . could be shown only by placing in the proper place 
the many pieces of evidence that, taken singly, would show comparatively little.”); United 
States v. Regan, 706 F. Supp. 1102, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The degree to which a warrant 
must state its terms with particularity varies inversely with the complexity of the criminal 
activity investigated.”).  The type of evidence sought is also relevant; in particular, courts 
have recognized that documentary evidence may be difficult to describe ex ante with the 
same particularity as a murder weapon or stolen property.  See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 
906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (“It is true that a warrant authorizing seizure of records of 
criminal activity permits officers to examine many papers in a suspect’s possession to 
determine if they are within the described category.  But allowing some latitude in this 
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judge who issued the warrant when assessing the sufficiency of the 
allegations or the description of the items sought.157  Thus, by allowing 
the issuing magistrate the ability to set the parameters of the search 
based on personalized knowledge of the specific facts at hand, courts are 
able to adequately safeguard Fourth Amendment interests by ensuring 
warrants are sufficiently particular and supported by probable cause.158  
Much of the disagreement so readily apparent among the courts and 
academics stems from a conflict over the importance of requiring law 
enforcement officials to preemptively secure a warrant.159  Importing 
                                                                                                             
regard simply recognizes the reality that few people keep documents of their criminal 
transactions in a folder marked ‘drug records.’”); United States v. Zanche, 541 F. Supp. 207, 
210 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Unlike other forms of property, business records are often incapable 
of being itemized one by one, particularly when their existence, but not their precise names 
or quantity, is all that is known.”). 
157 See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1012–13 (Callahan, J. and Ikuta, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that the majority opinions sweeping 
guidelines and broad prescriptions “go significantly beyond what is necessary,” and that 
“its protocols are dicta and might be best viewed as a ‘best practices’ manual”). 
158 See supra Part II.A.1–2 (discussing how courts have used the warrant and the 
particularity requirements to attempt to reconcile novel difficulties that computers create 
within the context of the Fourth Amendment). 
159 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971) (“Much the most important 
part of the conflict that has been so notable in this Court’s attempts over a hundred years to 
develop a coherent body of Fourth Amendment law has been caused by disagreement over 
the importance of requiring law enforcement officers to secure warrants.”).  Compare 
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1000 (holding that in order to guard against 
future constitutional violations, the issuing judicial officer should insert a preemptive 
search protocol), United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 890−91 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that where the police did not continue a search until after obtaining an additional search 
warrant, no constitutional violation occurred), and In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. 
Supp. 2d 953, 959−61 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that a magistrate can condition the search of 
computers on the government developing a search protocol before the actual search begins 
in order to prevent a general rummaging of the hard drive and files), with United States v. 
Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690, at *6 n.3 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2009) (“Even the 
most computer literate of judges would struggle to know what protocol is appropriate in 
any individual case, and the notion that a busy trial judge is going to be able to invent one 
out of whole cloth or to understand whether the proposed protocol meets ill-defined 
technical search standards seems unrealistic.”), United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 
2007 WL 1075041, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) (holding that while a warrant must state 
with sufficient particularity what is to be seized from a computer, “the warrant need not 
specify how the computers will be searched”), and United States v. Maali, 346 F. Supp. 2d 
1226, 1246 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (upholding the validity of a search despite the lack of a search 
protocol in the warrant under the assumption that “[w]hile it may be preferable and 
advisable to set forth a computer search strategy in a warrant affidavit, failure to do so 
does not render computer search provisions [unconstitutional]”).  See generally United 
States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that the warrant 
requirement was meant to act as a “bulwark against the ‘general warrant’” that the early 
colonists so despised); Vilar, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99409, at *1 (noting that the warrant 
requirement is the preeminent concern of the Fourth Amendment). 
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new theories and doctrines as well as imposing stilted judicial guidelines 
that serve as a beacon for future law enforcement does little to clarify the 
law surrounding Fourth Amendment searches and seizures involving 
computer or digital evidence.160 
Accepting this view, however, does not mean that the wholesale 
searches of data on computers or computer systems are permitted.161  
Courts instead look to traditional means of limiting the scope of 
document searches such as the nature of the criminal activity alleged or 
the nature of the objects sought in the search warrant.162  Furthermore, 
                                                 
160 See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1013 (Callahan and Ikuta, JJ., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“A measured approach based on the facts of a particular 
case is especially warranted in the case of computer-related technology, which is constantly 
and quickly evolving.  Accordingly, I cannot join in the majority’s approach regarding 
application of the plain view doctrine to digital evidence cases.”); see also id. at 1015, 1017 
(Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with “the majority’s analysis of 
the issues presented in this case, as applied to this case only” and adding that “[s]uch a rule 
departs from existing Supreme Court precedent regarding the ‘plain view’ 
exception . . . and [does] so without a single citation to the Supreme Court’s extensive 
precedent on the subject” (emphasis added)). 
161 See People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 153 (Colo. 2001) (holding that police “may search the 
location authorized by the warrant, including any containers at that location that are 
reasonably likely to contain items described in the warrant”, that “[t]his container rationale 
is equally applicable to nontraditional, technological ‘containers’ that are reasonably likely 
to hold information in less tangible forms,” and that courts cannot expect search warrants 
“to anticipate every form an item or repository of information may take, and therefore 
courts have affirmed the seizure of things that are similar to, or the ‘functional equivalent’ 
of, items enumerated in a warrant, as well as containers in which they are reasonably likely 
to be found”).  This is not to say, however, that courts adopting this view underestimate 
the differences in physical and digital evidence and documents; rather, they merely give 
significantly less weight to these differences or view them as immaterial to the analysis.  See 
id. (applying the container theory despite recognizing a heightened degree of intermingling 
of relevant and irrelevant evidence); see also United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 
581, 583−84 (D. Vt. 1998) (addressing the concerns of the intermingling of relevant and 
irrelevant information). 
162 See, e.g., Comprehensive Drug Testing II, 513 F.3d 1085, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(disagreeing with the dissent that the government should be forced to rely on the target of 
the search to point out the relevant files and copy only specific folders), vacated, 545 F.3d 
1106 (9th Cir. 2008), decision reached on appeal, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009).  The first panel 
decision of Comprehensive Drug Testing aptly recognized the following: 
“The government should not be required to trust the suspect’s self-
labeling when executing a warrant.”  Agents had no duty to rely on 
CDT personnel to point out the files seizable under the warrant.  Like 
most searched parties, CDT had an incentive to avoid giving over 
documents of which the government might be unaware and to read 
the search warrant as narrowly as possible.  Moreover, the 
government had no reason to confine its search to “key words” such 
as the names of the baseball players.  “Computer files are easy to 
disguise or rename, and were we to limit the warrant to such a 
specific search protocol, much evidence could escape discovery 
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because this view permits the law enforcement need to adapt with the 
various circumstances, it allows for a more proper administration of 
justice.163 
Finally, advocates of the container analogy—or perhaps more 
generally those opposing the special approach and opting for a more 
traditional case-by-case analysis—argue that the establishment of 
guidelines stands directly against the common law method of reasoned 
decisionmaking.164  In a time when computer technology is evolving at a 
tremendous pace, creating concrete guidelines that firmly establish 
bright lines is arguably unseemly.165  By evaluating each case on its own 
merits and attempting to resolve no more than is necessary, courts can 
employ the traditional common law method, which “recognizes the 
limitations of human ingenuity and wisdom.”166  The common law 
                                                                                                             
simply because of [the defendants’] labeling of the files.”  Such a 
limited search could easily have overlooked documents crucial to the 
investigation, such as the specimens at Quest, which were identified 
only by number. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
163 See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1018 (Bea, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(noting that “the establishment of guidelines . . . goes against the grain of the common law 
method of reasoned decisionmaking, by which rules evolve from cases over time,” and that 
“[b]y focusing on the ‘plain view’ exception as applied to [the case at bar] . . . we would be 
employing the traditional common law method of deciding novel questions of law,” and 
that this method “recognizes the limitations of human ingenuity and wisdom, by limiting 
[judicial] decisions as precisely as possible to the case at hand”).  Circuit Judge Bea aptly 
recognizes in his dissent that “[t]he common law method permits us to evaluate different 
cases over time to discern the most sensible rule given the technologies that develop.”  Id. 
164 Id.  To some extent, the Tenth Circuit—itself explicitly adopting a special approach to 
computer evidence—has chosen to adhere to the common law method of reasoned 
decisionmaking based narrowly on the facts at hand, such as noting that 
 [t]he essential inquiry when faced with challenges under the 
Fourth Amendment is whether the search or seizure was reasonable—
reasonableness is analyzed in light of what was reasonable at the time 
of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption.  It is axiomatic that the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted as a direct response to the evils of the 
general warrants in England and the writs of assistance in the 
Colonies. 
O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1472 (10th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). 
165 See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1018 (noting that the establishment of 
guidelines “is particularly troublesome in a rapidly developing area of law such as this one, 
as computer search capabilities improve exponentially by the month”).  Circuit Judge Bea 
also noted that the courts do not have the same competitive advantage that Congress has 
for establishing guidelines, perhaps implicitly suggesting that turning to the legislature is 
one avenue for dealing with such a timely dilemma.  See id. 
166 Id.  The primary reason for Judge Bea’s dissent was the fact that by issuing bright-line, 
prophylactic rules, the majority opinion “short-circuits this process in an area where the 
capabilities of computer software are still rapidly evolving.”  Id.  Furthermore, although 
both the Tenth Circuit and Ninth Circuit seemingly employ similar strategies in combating 
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method permits courts to evaluate different cases over time to determine 
the most sensible rule at any given moment and given any new 
technologies that may develop.167 
All in all, the different approaches to applying the plain view 
exception attempt to reconcile the needs of adequate law enforcement on 
the one hand, with the expectations of privacy that are guaranteed to us 
through the devices of the Fourth Amendment, on the other hand.168  
Although these are indeed noble causes and should be considered in 
proper Fourth Amendment analysis, the current approaches to this novel 
difficulty fail to safeguard the interests of both parties involved.169  The 
special approaches attempting to deal with this problem strongly favor 
the individual and ultimately cripple the ability of officials to enforce the 
law.170  Advocates of the closed-container analogy fail to sufficiently 
defend the constitutional rights provided by the Fourth Amendment 
while attempting to apply traditional values and concepts implicit in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.171  It is inevitable that the Supreme 
Court will consider the issue, and when it does, it should employ an 
approach that adequately balances each of the competing interests 
                                                                                                             
the plain view doctrine, the majority’s issuance of bright-line rules contradicts the special 
approach of the Tenth Circuit.  See id. at 1018 n.3 (noting that the majority’s broad, 
prophylactic guidelines “conflict with the more cautious, common law-style approach of 
the Tenth Circuit, which has implicitly recognized the ‘plain view’ exception exists in [this] 
context . . . but has not delineated its precise scope”). 
167 Id. at 1018.  Interestingly, Judge Bea actually contends that the majority opinion in 
Comprehensive Drug Testing conflicts with the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Carey, at least 
insofar as it attempts to establish concrete judicial guidelines.  See id.  It seems clear that 
some of the Comprehensive Drug Testing opinion conflicts with Carey, because Carey 
implicitly recognized that the plain view exception applies in computer evidence cases, 
whereas Comprehensive Drug Testing explicitly contends that the plain view exception should 
not apply.  Id. at 998.  Compare Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 998 (majority 
opinion) (holding that “the government should . . . forswear use of the plain view doctrine 
or any similar doctrine” (emphasis added)), with United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that satisfaction of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement 
should ultimately turn on the subjective intent of the searching officials).  See also United 
States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that no constitutional 
violation occurred where the government inadvertently discovered child pornography and 
subsequently applied for an additional warrant). 
168 See supra Part III (discussing the different approaches courts have created to reconcile 
the competing interests in this area). 
169 See supra Part III (analyzing the different approaches that courts have taken and 
suggesting that each of them fails to adequately weigh and balance the competing 
interests). 
170 See supra Part III.B (evaluating the special approaches to the plain view doctrine as 
applied to computer evidence). 
171 See supra Part III.C (analyzing the closed-container approach that a series of courts 
have taken to attempt to apply Fourth Amendment values to novel difficulties that arise in 
the context of computer-based evidence). 
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involved and mandate a course of action that appropriately safeguards 
each of the various concerns.172 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Every government search or seizure of a digital, electronic, or 
computer-related device poses a potential problem for law enforcement 
officials.173  This Part proposes a solution that is sensitive to these 
concerns while still protecting individual liberties.174  Some have argued 
that in order for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to remain consistent, 
courts should analyze the problems on a case-by-case basis, offering 
little, if any, by means of prophylactic advice.175  Others have determined 
that current Fourth Amendment principles are simply insufficient to 
handle such technological advances and that a new, more specialized 
body of law must emerge to efficiently handle these complex new 
problems.176  Nonetheless, all are in favor of a solution that adequately 
balances the interests of law enforcement officials in carrying out their 
duties and responsibilities with the privacy, possessory, and 
constitutional interests to which every American is entitled.177  This Note 
espouses such a solution by implementing the inadvertent discovery 
requirement for plain view seizures that grants latitude to law 
enforcement while preventing general and pretextual searches.  
Additionally, this Note outlines the proposed solution’s  rationale and 
practical application.178  Accordingly, the Supreme Court should 
                                                 
172 See infra Part IV (proposing a workable solution to this problem). 
173 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the novel difficulties that digital, electronic, and 
computer evidence creates); supra Part III.A–B (discussing and analyzing the differing 
approaches that courts have taken to attempt to solve these complex problems). 
174 See infra Part IV.A (proposing that the Supreme Court should implement the 
inadvertent discovery requirement for valid plain view seizures of electronically stored and 
computer-related evidence). 
175 See, e.g., supra note 163 (discussing the inherent advantages to narrowing the holding 
to what is essential and allowing the law to develop slowly but surely as a principle of the 
common law). 
176 See, e.g., supra note 148 (discussing different attempts to “update” Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and create new standards and tests of substantive law). 
177 See, e.g., supra Part III.B–C (providing that those in favor of the “special approaches” 
and those in favor of using analogies attempt to balance the competing interest of law 
enforcement and individual citizens). 
178 See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the rationale behind implementing or retaining the 
inadvertent discovery requirement for plain view seizures); infra Part IV.B.2 (applying the 
proposed standard to the facts of Comprehensive Drug Testing).  Further, whether this 
proposal is termed “retention” or “implementation” is irrelevant to the inquiry at hand.  
What is paramount is whether the discovery of evidence that is not inadvertent will render 
the plain view doctrine inapplicable to justify the seizure of the evidence, notwithstanding 
whether the requirement is “retained” or “implemented.” 
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confront the issue directly, despite its controversial nature, because 
allowing the law to remain so staunchly unsettled compromises the 
interests of millions of Americans.179 
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a case factually similar 
to Comprehensive Drug Testing—a case requiring direct application of the 
plain view doctrine to computer-related evidence.  The Supreme Court 
should apply existing Fourth Amendment plain view principles while 
preventing the most prominent evil of the Fourth Amendment—the 
general warrant.180  The Court should remain cognizant that vast 
differences exist between physical evidence and digital evidence.181  
Upon recognizing this distinction, the Court could either:  (1) overrule 
Horton explicitly and reinstate the inadvertent discovery requirement 
entirely; or (2) distinguish the case from Horton.182  However, because 
complete reinstatement of the inadvertent discovery requirement would 
require the Court to overrule a litany of cases that have further 
developed plain view jurisprudence and is ultimately unnecessary, the 
most prudent course of action is distinguishing between physical and 
digital evidence.183 
                                                 
179 See Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court, 
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989 (2009) (No. 05-10067) (suggesting that police 
and courts alike are not sure to what extent the judicially crafted guidelines are mandatory 
or whether they should apply to other types of evidence such as cellular phones or similar 
devices). 
180 Cf. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“The manifest purpose of this 
particularity requirement was to prevent general searches,” and that “the requirement 
ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the 
character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit”). 
181 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the novel difficulties created by inherent differences 
between physical and electronic evidence); supra Part III.A (discussing the circumstances 
under which searches and seizures of electronic information are most likely to become 
general and exploratory in nature—and therefore unconstitutional). 
182 See supra notes 52–54, 61–62 (discussing the Coolidge and Horton decisions and the 
Court’s decision to remove the inadvertent discovery requirement from plain view 
analysis). 
183 Overruling Horton would allow the court to reinstate the inadvertent discovery 
requirement of the plain view doctrine, but would reinstate the requirement for all plain 
view seizures.  The Court in Horton disposed of the inadvertent discovery requirement but 
never mentioned the differences in physical and digital evidence.  See Horton v. California, 
496 U.S. 128, 129–30 (1990), (suggesting the inadvertent discovery requirement is not 
necessary as applied to a car on the defendant’s property).  Horton dealt entirely with 
physical evidence, however.  Id.  It is markedly undisputed that the risk of general 
warrants and government overreaching is far greater when dealing with computer-related 
evidence.  See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(finding that “[t]his pressing need of law enforcement for broad authorization to examine 
electronic records . . . creates a serious risk that every warrant for electronic information 
will become, in effect, a general warrant” and accepting “the reality that such over-seizing 
is an inherent part of the electronic search process”), revised and superseded per curiam, 621 
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A. Proposed Solution:  Retain the Inadvertent Discovery Requirement for 
Electronically Stored Evidence 
Stare decisis concerns counsel that complete abrogation of the Horton 
reasoning is unnecessary.  When faced with physical evidence, the 
inadvertent discovery requirement may actually remain unnecessary 
largely because objective criteria effectively limit the scope of a seizure.  
This is not so with digital evidence.  Objective characteristics such as size 
limit the scope of a physical search.  For instance, police cannot search 
for stolen stereo equipment in small dresser drawers, a vehicle inside of 
a home (except the garage), or, perhaps more illustratively, an entire 
building because contraband is found in one container.184  Thus, the 
objective characteristics of physical evidence help determine the scope of 
the search or seizure—the scope is defined by “the object of the search 
and the places in which there is probable cause to believe the object may 
be found.”185  However, because an officer cannot know the contents of a 
computer file until it has already been opened, these characteristics 
cannot adequately guide police seizures or limit intrusions upon 
constitutional liberties.186  Thus, although requiring inadvertent 
discovery may not be necessary to limit plain view seizures of physical 
evidence, the same cannot rightly be said of electronically stored 
                                                                                                             
F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also Kerr, supra note 65, at 280, 289–90 (suggesting 
that physical world rules impose practically no limitations on searches of computer 
evidence and “permit extraordinarily invasive government powers to go unregulated”); 
Winick, supra note 14, at 80 (suggesting adamantly that general searches are far more 
prevalent in the context of computer-related evidence); supra Part II.B (discussing the 
difficulties of preventing general searches); supra Part III.A (analyzing the circumstances 
under which searches are more likely to become general or exploratory in nature).  
Nonetheless, because overruling Horton would undo and overturn much of the twenty 
years of case law that have developed since its inception and because physical evidence 
creates fewer problems than electronically stored evidence, overruling Horton is perhaps 
unwarranted. 
184 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (“Probable cause to believe that a 
container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a 
search of the entire cab.”). 
185 Horton, 496 U.S. at 140–41 (“Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower 
may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, 
probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not 
justify a warrantless search of a suitcase.” (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 824)).  Assuming, 
arguendo, that this notion does adequately protect the constitutional interests of citizens by 
guiding the efforts of law enforcement, such objective criteria are inherently absent when 
courts are confronted with computer-related evidence.  See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 
579 F.3d at 1004 (recognizing that law enforcement cannot know the contents of a file or 
determine its relevancy to the search until the file has been opened and examined); United 
States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing the same). 
186 See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 U.S. at 1004 (“There is no way to be sure exactly 
what an electronic file contains without somehow examining its contents . . . .”). 
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evidence.187  Allowing such warrantless seizures condones grave 
erosions to personal liberties. 
The Supreme Court should therefore declare that Horton’s alteration 
of the plain view doctrine is inapplicable to computer-related evidence.  
The Court should announce that the plain view doctrine, as applied to 
computer-related evidence, is consistent with the view of Justice 
Stewart’s opinion in Coolidge and Justice Brennan’s dissent in Horton by 
ruling that 
as applied to electronically stored and computer-related 
evidence, the final limitation on the application of the plain 
view doctrine is that the discovery of evidence in plain view 
must be inadvertent.188 
B. Commentary 
This requirement is necessary to ensure that initially valid—and 
therefore limited—seizures do not become general.  Where the discovery 
of evidence is anticipated—that is, where police know in advance the 
location of the evidence and intend to seize it—requiring that officials 
obtain a warrant imposes no cognizable inconvenience in a system that 
regards warrantless searches as per se unreasonable.  This rule does not 
create a cost on efficient law enforcement; it is the Fourth Amendment 
itself that imposes such limits on government officials.  The inadvertent 
discovery requirement is merely the attendant manifestation of the 
Fourth Amendment’s own requirement that the items to be seized be 
particularly described in a warrant.  Police may not intentionally search 
for and seize items not described therein.  Where the government wishes 
to invoke the plain view doctrine, it must show that no probable cause 
for the seizure existed at the time that the particular warrant was issued.  
This requirement is nothing more than a restatement of the explicit 
                                                 
187 According to Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall, the inadvertent discovery 
requirement is not actually a judicially crafted notion but rather it is a necessary incident of 
the Fourth Amendment’s explicit mandates.  See, e.g., Horton, 496 U.S. at 142 (Brennan and 
Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (“In eschewing the inadvertent discovery requirement, the 
majority ignores the Fourth Amendment’s express command that warrants particularly 
describe not only the places to be searched, but also the things to be seized.”); Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971) (“The limits on the doctrine are implicit in the 
statement of its rationale.”). 
188 The italicized text is the original contribution of the author and is modeled after both 
the language and notion of Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion in Coolidge and Justice 
Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Horton.  Cf. Horton, 496 U.S. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“I remain convinced that Justice Stewart correctly articulated the plain-view doctrine in 
[Coolidge].”); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469 (“The second limitation [on application of the plain 
view doctrine] is that the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent.”).  
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mandate of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.  It is but 
a logical extension of the notion, heralded by the Court in Horton, that all 
warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable absent exigent 
circumstances.189 
1. The Rationale 
The plain view exception to the warrant requirement primarily 
operates to supplement the efforts of law enforcement officials by 
allowing warrantless seizures where “the inconvenience [of procuring a 
warrant] incurred by police is simply not that significant.”190  However, 
where the discovery of the evidence is expected, the justification of 
inconvenience is entirely baseless.  The few exceptions to the warrant 
requirement provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining 
a warrant, such as danger to law enforcement officers or the risk of 
destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a 
neutral and detached magistrate.  Because, however, each exception to 
the warrant requirement invariably impinges on the protective purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment, the exceptions have been carefully delineated 
and the burden remains on those seeking to enforce the exception to 
show its necessity.  Without the inadvertence requirement in plain view 
analysis of electronically stored information, the Fourth Amendment’s 
goals of encouraging police resort to the warrant process and limiting 
authorized intrusions to the smallest extent possible is substantially and 
irreparably subverted. 
Although requiring inadvertent discovery may appear insensitive to 
the efforts of law enforcement officials, this is a misconception.  The 
Fourth Amendment does not deny law enforcement officials “the 
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from 
evidence.”191  The Fourth Amendment merely requires that these 
inferences be drawn by neutral and detached magistrates.  Further, this 
requirement remains necessary to prevent pretextual seizures of 
electronic information because there is no rationale to excuse officials 
from the warrant requirement when they know the location of evidence, 
have probable cause to seize it, intend to seize it, and yet fail—willfully 
or neglectfully—to obtain a warrant particularly describing it.  The 
inadvertence requirement makes planned searches and seizures without 
a warrant impossible.  A rule allowing seizures of items not listed on a 
                                                 
189 See Horton, 496 U.S. 128 (reinforcing the notion that warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable absent exigent circumstances). 
190 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981). 
191 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
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warrant and not inadvertently found would wholly abrogate the 
particularity and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
If law enforcement officials abide by the explicit commands of the 
Fourth Amendment, they should have no reason to spite this 
requirement.  In fact, there should be no additional burden upon law 
enforcement officials whatsoever.  The Fourth Amendment protects 
citizens’ privacy and possessory interests by mandating that a neutral 
and detached magistrate issue the warrant.  The interests of law 
enforcement officials in expedient investigation are de minimis when 
balanced against these possessory and privacy interests explicitly 
protected by the Constitution. 
Where there exists no justification for excusing the warrantless 
seizure, doing so would violate the constitutional requirement that 
warrants particularly describe the things to be seized and that neutral 
and detached magistrates make probable cause determinations.  It would 
ultimately “fly in the face of the basic rule that no amount of probable 
cause can justify a warrantless seizure.”192  Without a showing that law 
enforcement efforts are impeded or the administration of justice is 
hindered, there exists no conceivable rational basis for allowing the 
warrantless seizure of electronically stored information discovered 
intentionally.  Where government officials are present to execute a 
warrant and seize items not particularly described, it must be shown that 
the officers had no intention of searching for and seizing those items.  
Inconvenience to the police and a slight delay caused by preparing 
papers for a magistrate are never convincing reasons to bypass the 
warrant requirement.193  The warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment is not some mere technicality or inconvenience; it is an 
explicit command of the Constitution.194  Accordingly, the police may 
not—consistent with the Constitution and traditional Fourth 
Amendment values—plan a plain view seizure.195 
Ultimately, the sensitivity and import of the interests presented 
when constitutional freedoms clash with law enforcement efforts leave 
                                                 
192 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471. 
193 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 706 (1948). 
194 Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) (“The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not 
dead language.”).  The Court also noted that the Fourth Amendment, and the warrant 
requirement in particular, should remain “‘an important working part of our machinery of 
government, operating as a matter of course to check the ‘well-intentioned but mistakenly 
over-zealous executive officers’ who are a party of any system of law enforcement.’”  Id. at 
316 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468). 
195 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 144 (1990) (“A decision to invade a possessory 
interest in property is too important to be left to the discretion of zealous officers ‘engaged 
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” (quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 
14)). 
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attorneys relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than 
appropriate in the context of a particular case.  Unequivocal retention of 
the inadvertent discovery requirement provides an equitable boundary 
between the competing interests involved with seizures of electronically 
stored evidence.  It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest 
in allowing police wide latitude in conducting comprehensive 
investigations, yet also shields the individual from overt government 
intrusion upon basic constitutional liberties.  Notwithstanding the 
strength of the State’s interest, the government may not, consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment, know in advance the location of certain 
evidence and intend to seize it, relying on the plain view doctrine solely 
as a pretext. 
2. Practical Application 
Maintaining the inadvertent discovery requirement for plain view 
seizures of electronically stored information should ultimately affect 
very few cases.  It remains necessary, however, to ensure that 
government searches do not become general and exploratory in nature.  
For example, in the situation involving a search of a home computer for 
business or personal records of a specific crime, if the government 
officials inadvertently open a file that contains child pornography, the 
government would still be able to seize the information and use it at a 
later date.  This is because the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent.  
By contrast, if the government knew ahead of time of the child 
pornography and had an intention to seize it, mandating that they obtain 
a warrant creates no additional obstacle or inconvenience.  Thus, 
requiring that the discovery of evidence be inadvertent ensures that 
officials do not obtain the child pornography under false pretenses or 
without a warrant particularly describing the items to be seized.  This 
rule is sensitive to law enforcement interests in conducting expedient 
investigations by allowing warrantless seizures when contraband is 
inadvertently discovered, as well as to the Fourth Amendment’s explicit 
commands regarding particularized warrants and probable cause 
determinations. 
To further illustrate the application of this concept, an application to 
the facts of Comprehensive Drug Testing is illustrative.196  Instead of 
proscribing the government’s use of the plain view doctrine entirely, the 
Court should examine whether the seizure complied with the four 
                                                 
196 See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), revised and 
superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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elements of a valid plain view seizure.197  The analysis would follow that 
(1) the evidence was in plain view; (2) the investigators were in a lawful 
position because they had a warrant to search for information pertaining 
to the ten specified players; and (3) the incriminating nature of the 
evidence was immediately apparent because it was precisely the same 
evidence as what allowed them the initial search and seizure.198  
However, the fourth and final element is not satisfied because the law 
enforcement officials knew the location of the evidence ahead of time, 
intended to seize it, and failed to procure a warrant—either through 
neglect or lack of probable cause; the discovery of the evidence cannot 
rightly be classified “inadvertent” and the government must return the 
seized information.199  Because the government did not discover the 
evidence inadvertently, it did not satisfy all of the requisite elements of a 
plain view seizure and the seizure was unconstitutional.200 
The government in Comprehensive Drug Testing was fully aware of 
the location of the information relating to the other professional 
athletes.201  In fact, after obtaining nearly all of the information contained 
in the search warrant, the government “peruse[d]” the rest of the 
directory in an attempt to collect as much incriminating information as 
possible.202  It is precisely this type of governmental overreaching that 
warrants the implementation or retention of the inadvertent discovery 
requirement in the context of electronically stored evidence.  Without 
such a requirement, well-intentioned but often zealous law enforcement 
officials would smother the constitutional rights of the citizenry.203 
                                                 
197 The four elements of valid plain view seizures of electronically stored evidence, as 
proposed by this Note are that (1) the evidence must be in plain view, (2) the officer must 
view the evidence from a lawful vantage point, (3) the illegality of the evidence must be 
immediately apparent, and (4) the discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent.  See supra 
notes 54 & 61 (discussing the elements of the plain view doctrine as articulated in Coolidge, 
and how the inadvertent discovery requirement was subsequently trimmed from the 
requisite inquiry by the majority decision in Horton).  Perhaps Horton might best be 
understood to modify Coolidge only insofar as it applies to physical evidence.  Because the 
Court was not confronted with electronically stored evidence, the Court did not have to 
decide that issue.  See Horton, 496 U.S. at 140–42 (discussing specifically the tangible 
characteristics of physical evidence that render the inadvertent discovery requirement 
arguably superfluous).  Thus, this Note offers a guide as to what the Court should do when 
it confronts the issue at last. 
198 But cf. Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1005 (mandating that the 
government forswear use of the plain view doctrine or any similar doctrine). 
199 Id. at 999–1000. 
200 Id. at 997–99. 
201 Id. at 999. 
202 Id. at 999–1000. 
203 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 143–47 (1990) (Brennan, and Marshall, JJ. 
dissenting) (arguing that even as applied to physical evidence, the inadvertent discovery 
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To equate patently warrantless seizures of electronically stored 
information with valid plain view seizures demeans the grand 
conception of the Fourth Amendment and its lofty purpose in the 
historic struggle for freedom.204  The plain view exception to the warrant 
requirement is a necessary incident of legitimate law enforcement efforts, 
but the intentional seizure of items not particularly described is 
altogether different.205  Although the interests of the state are by no 
means trivial or insignificant, they compel the conclusion that these 
interests cannot justify the substantial damage and erosion to 
constitutional rights that inevitably result from whimsically allowing 
warrantless seizures of electronically stored information.206 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Two of the most reinforced rules of the Fourth Amendment are that 
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and warrants must be 
sufficiently particularized.  From these two fundamental principles flows 
the assumption that police cannot seize evidence without a warrant 
merely because they position themselves in a way that makes the 
evidence visible.  Cognizant of this, the Court in Coolidge articulated a 
standard for plain view seizures when faced with physical evidence, 
which the Court previously found unnecessary in Horton.207  However, 
                                                                                                             
requirement is necessary to keep law enforcement officials from eroding and intruding 
upon basic constitutional liberties). 
204 Cf. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972) (“Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate 
is the time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights.” (citing Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964))); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961) (“Historically 
the struggle for freedom . . . in England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the 
search and seizure power.”). 
205 See Horton, 496 U.S. at 144–45 (finding that absent exigent circumstances there is no 
reason to allow warrantless seizures because “[t]he rationale behind the inadvertent 
discovery requirement is simply that we will not excuse officers from the general 
requirement of a warrant . . . if the officers know the location of evidence, have probable 
cause to seize it, intend to seize it, and yet do not bother to obtain a warrant particularly 
describing that evidence”). 
206 See id. at 144 (citations omitted) (“A decision to invade a possessory interest in 
property is too important to be left to the discretion of zealous officers ‘engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 
10, 14 (1948))); see also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (“The framers of 
the Fourth Amendment must have concluded that reasonably strict search and seizure 
requirements were not too costly a price to pay for protection against the dangers incident 
to invasion of private premises and papers by officers, some of whom might be 
overzealous and oppressive.”). 
207 See supra notes 54 & 61 (discussing the original four elements of valid plain view 
seizures as articulated in Coolidge and the subsequent revision of the doctrine in Horton that 
saw the tailoring of the inadvertent discovery requirement). 
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considering the Court has always been wary of the “grave dangers” 
inherent in authorizing a seizure of a person’s papers that are not 
inherent in physical evidence searches—and has yet to consider the 
Fourth Amendment’s application to electronically stored information—it 
is likely the Court will find the vast differences between physical and 
digital evidence significant.208 
As exemplified by Comprehensive Drug Testing and similar cases, law 
enforcement officials are often involved in the competitive enterprise of 
“ferreting out crime” and are therefore occasioned to overzealous 
tendencies.  The occurrence of such evils increases greatly in the context 
of electronically stored information.  Requiring inadvertent discovery 
should not at all hinder the efforts of law enforcement officials to obtain 
the evidence necessary for conviction of crimes to which they have 
probable cause.  Nonetheless, this requirement remains necessary to 
ensure that when the plain view doctrine is applied in the context of 
electronically stored evidence, it complies with the text of the Fourth 
Amendment.  By permitting this exception to the warrant requirement, 
courts are tolerating government officials’ direct violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Therefore, exceptions must be drawn as narrowly as 
possible.  It cannot be said with enough emphasis that “[i]t is the duty of 
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and 
against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”209 
It is plausible that maintaining the inadvertent discovery 
requirement for plain view seizures of electronically stored evidence will 
affect relatively few police seizures.  However, as Justice Bradley wisely 
observed over a century ago, “illegitimate and unconstitutional practices 
get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from 
legal modes of procedure.”210  With this concern in mind, the Supreme 
Court must establish a standard that adequately protects the privacy and 
possessory interests of the individual while accommodating law 
enforcement’s legitimate need for flexibility in conducting computer 
searches.  Implementing or retaining the inadvertent discovery 
requirement in the context of plain view seizures of electronically stored 
evidence offers the most viable method for ensuring that government 
seizures of electronically stored evidence do not become general or 
exploratory and comply with the explicit commands of the Fourth 
                                                 
208 Cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (“We recognize that there are 
grave dangers inherent in executing a warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a 
person’s papers that are not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for 
physical objects.”). 
209 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). 
210 Id. 
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Amendment.  This standard will neither unduly burden the efforts of 
law enforcement authorities to maintain order in a civilized society nor 
authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of the American 
citizenry. 
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